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The maternal as hospitality 
Abstract 
There is significant play between the trope of hospitality as providing a political ontology and arguments 
that the maternal as pregnant embodiment is the original hospitality and thus the grounds of ethical 
engagement. For example, Diprose’s critique of a political ontology of hospitality identifies that political 
hospitality is only possible due to women giving their lived time as potential mothers towards establishing 
and maintaining domestic stability. The more conditional the hospitality the more existing inequities are 
exploited with women increasingly unlikely to garner recognition for their civil rights over embodiment and 
reproduction. Alternately Aristarkova argues that the Levinasian-Derridean conception of hospitality 
would benefit from acknowledging that the dematerialised idea of femininity as familiarity is a description 
of the maternal relation and it is the maternal body that grounds acts of hospitality. Such 
acknowledgement would open the possibility for welcoming the maternal into the discourse and provide 
a solution to Derrida’s aporia of ownership. The structure of images, here primarily the trope of the 
maternal to guide the development of a concept of the ethical and political subject, must be examined 
more thoroughly. In this paper we undertake a parallel reading of the maternal and the concept of 
hospitality by drawing upon La Caze’s work on specific forms of images used in philosophical thinking 
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Opened in October 2004, the Fale Pasifika is a traditional 
Pacific Island meetinghouse. It is the second largest in the 
Southern Hemisphere, and stands 12 metres high. The timber 
framework is New Zealand Radiata Pine, some of which was 
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Welcome to the ASCP Annual Conference for 2012! The 
Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland, is delighted to be 
hosting the conference again this year. We trust that you will enjoy 
your time in Auckland and we hope that you will have a chance to 
enjoy the city and its beautiful surroundings. This booklet contains 
some basic information that may be of use during your visit. If you 
have any questions, don’t hesitate to ask any of the organisers and 


















K E Y N O T E  





Todd May  (Clemson) 
Title: Humanism and Solidarity 
 
Abstract: Recent years have seen the rise of a new type of anti-humanism, what 
might be called an a-humanism of systems theory.  Two important exponents of this 
view are John Protevi and Jane Bennett, both of whom root their thought in the work 
of Gilles Deleuze.  In different but related ways, they see human beings as part of a 
wider system that can operate at both the sub- and supra-inpidual levels as well as the 
inpidual one.  This raises the question of how to conceive a politics based on their 
perspectives.  This paper argues that, although the horizontal character of their 
ontology is in keeping with an egalitarian politics, it is difficult if not impossible to 
ground a politics of solidarity in this approach.  This is because the bonds necessary 
for political solidarity cannot be forged across all elements or aspects of the system. 
 
Bio: Dr. May took his Ph.D. from Penn State University in 1989, and has been at 
Clemson (after a brief stint at Indiana University of Pennsylvania) since 1991. He 
specializes in Continental philosophy, especially recent French philosophy. He has 
authored ten philosophical books, focusing on the philosophical work of Michel 
Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Rancière. His book The Political Philosophy of 
Poststructuralist Anarchism has been influential in recent progressive political thought, 
and his work on Rancière is among the first in English. May’s writings also seek to 
bridge the gap between "Anglo-American" and "Continental" styles of philosophy 
that developed in the early twentieth century. His teaching interests are varied; he has 
found himself teaching classes as diverse as Anarchism, The Thought of Merleau-
Ponty, Resistance and Alterity in Contemporary Culture, Secular Ethics in a 




Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy Conference 2012 
! 3 
 
Claire Colebrook  (PennState / UNSW) 
Title: Hypo-hyper-hapto-neuromysticism 
 
Abstract: In his homage and memorial to Jean-Luc Nancy, Derrida refers to an 
intensified hyper-haptocentrism in twentieth-century thought. Since making that 
judgment a series of manoeuvres within philosophy and theory have intensified this 
insistence on the values of proximity and affective immediacy, suggesting that 
Cartesian reason and separation have been displaced as the normative model for 
thinking. One of the most significant figures for this new axiology of close range 
thinking is the embodied brain, now deemed to be the decentred, attuned, dynamic 
and pre-personal ground of all thought and life. Indeed in popular culture the brain 
now offers itself as a symbolic resolution to many of the most profound ethical 
dilemmas, including the ethics of touch. The brain is at once always multiply affected 
and attuned - hyper-tactile - and yet always operating at a distance, embodied without 
being actually tactile. Looking at Derrida's work on touch, Deleuze's work on sense 
and a series of texts on touch, including the Fox TV series Touch and Jerry 
Sandusky's Touched I argue for a Cartesian ethics of separation. 
 
 
Bio: Claire Colebrook is the author of New Literary Histories (Manchester UP, 
1997), Ethics and Representation (Edinburgh UP, 1999), Deleuze: A Guide for the 
Perplexed (Continuum 1997), Gilles Deleuze (Routledge 2002), Understanding Deleuze (Allen 
and Unwin 2002), Irony in the Work of Philosophy (Nebraska UP, 2002), Gender (Palgrave 
2003), Irony(Routledge 2004), Milton, Evil and Literary History (Continuum 2008), Deleuze 
and the Meaning of Life (Continuum 2010), and William Blake and Digital 
Aesthetics (Continuum 2011).  She co-authored Theory and the Disappearing Future with 
Tom Cohen and J. Hillis Miller (Routledge 2011), and co-edited Deleuze and Feminist 
Theory with Ian Buchanan (Edinburgh University Press, 2000), Deleuze and History with 
Jeff Bell (Edinburgh 2008), Deleuze and Gender with Jami Weinstein (Edinburgh UP 
2009) and Deleuze and Law with Rosi Braidotti and Patrick Hanafin (Palgrave, 
2009).  She has written articles on visual culture, poetry, literary theory, queer theory 
and contemporary culture.  She is completing a book on human extinction. 
  
 
Georgia Warnke  (UC Riverside) 
Title: Deliberation and Interpretation 
 
Abstract: Deliberative democratic theory takes up the question of how the citizens of 
diverse and pluralistic democracies, citizens who by definition possess different 
interests, values and conceptions of the good, can nonetheless reach decisions, enact 
laws, and determine policies that they can all find legitimate and binding.  The 
answer the theory gives looks to non-coercive deliberations among free and equal 
citizens who justify their claims and proposals by appealing to public reasons or 
considerations – in other words, to reasons and considerations all those affected can 
accept.  Yet it is not clear that in diverse and pluralistic democracies what stymies 
democratic justification is the failure to offer or accept public reasons or 
considerations.  Can we not agree on public reasons while understanding them in 
different but equally compelling ways and does the same not hold for such 
considerations as narratives, testimony and the like?  Indeed, might it not be that what 
stymies justification is our failure to acknowledge that we can agree on public reasons 
and considerations while understanding them in different but equally compelling 
ways?  The first part of this paper explores these questions as they relate both to the 
original formulations of deliberative theory and to certain revisions.  The second part 
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of the paper investigates a hermeneutic alternative that not only acknowledges but 
also values differences in the ways we can plausibly understand our public reasons and 
considerations. 
 
Bio: Professor Warnke's research interests include critical theory, hermeneutics, 
democratic theory and issues of race, sex and gender. Her latest book is After Identity: 
Rethinking Race, Sex and Gender (Cambridge University Press, 2007). Recently she has 
written articles on Jurgen Habermas, Richard Rorty and Clifford Geertz. Recent 
graduate courses have focused on Habermas, Hans-Georg Gadamer and issues of 








P L E N A R Y  






Keith Ansell-Pearson (Warwick) 
Mark Kelly (Middlesex) 
Jessica Whyte (UWS) 
Paul Patton (UNSW) 
 
Bio: Paul Patton is Professor of philosophy in the School of History and Philosophy at the University of 
New South Wales, where he has been since 2002. Patton received a B.A. and M.A. from the University 
of Sydney, and, in 1979, received a Doctorat D'Universite from Paris VIII, (Vincennes). Before he took 
up his professorship at University of New South Wales, Patton lectured at the Australian National 
University and the University of Sydney. Patton is a member of the Australasian Association of 
Philosophy. Patton has published widely on aspects of 20th Century French philosophy, including focus 
on the works of Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault. He is the author of Deleuzian Concepts: Philosophy, 
Colonization, Politics (Stanford UP, 2010), Deleuze and the Political (Routledge, 2000). He edited Nietzsche, 
Feminism and Political Theory (Routledge, 1993), Deleuze: A Critical Reader (Blackwell, 1991) and co-edited 
Deleuze and the Postcolonial with Simone Bignall (Edinburgh UP, 2010), Poetics of In-Between Space with 
Sang-Koo Kim (Pusan National University Press, 2005), Between Deleuze and Derrida with John Protevi 
(Continuum, 2003), Jacques Derrida: Deconstruction Engaged – The Sydney Seminars with Terry Smith (Power 
Publications, 2001) and Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples with Duncan Ivison and Will 
Sanders (Cambridge UP, 2000).  
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Kevin Hart  
Speakers 
Claire Colebrook (Penn State / UNSW) 
Chris Watkin (Monash) 
Michael Parmenter (Auckland) 
Kevin Hart (Virginia / ACU) 
 
Bio: Kevin Hart is a British-Australian theologian, philosopher and poet. He is currently Edwin B. 
Kyle Professor of Christian Studies and Chair of the Religious Studies Department at the University of 
Virginia and is the Eric D’Arcy Professor of Philosophy at the Australian Catholic University. As a 
theologian and philosopher, Hart's work epitomizes the "theological turn" in phenomenology, with a 
focus on figures like Maurice Blanchot, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion and Jacques Derrida. He 
has received multiple awards for his poetry, including the Christopher Brennan Award and the Grace 
Leven Prize for Poetry twice. He is the author of The Dark Gaze: Maurice Blanchot and the Sacred (Chicago 
UP, 2004), Postmodernism: A Beginner’s Guide (Oneworld, 2004), The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, 
Theology and Philosophy (Cambridge UP, 1989). He is the editor of Clandestine Encounters: Philosophy in the 
Narratives of Maurice Blanchot (Notre Dame UP, 2010) and Counter-Experiences: Reading Jean-Luc Marion 
(Notre Dame UP, 2007). He is co-editor of The Exorbitant: Emmanuel Levinas between Jews and Christians 
with Michael A. Signer (Fordham UP, 2010), The Experience of God with Barbara Wall (Fordham UP, 
2005), The Power of Contestation: Perspectives on Maurice Blanchot with Geoffrey Hartman (Johns Hopkins UP, 
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Mathew Abbott (University of Ballarat, mathewabbott@gmail.com) 
Ordinary Happiness: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Agamben 
 
Developing the concept of happiness at work in the early Wittgenstein, and showing how it clarifies the 
Heideggerian idea that modernity is the age in which the world is set up as something to be pictured by 
a subject, in this paper I set these concepts to work in a reading of Agamben’s political ontology. I 
argue that appreciating Agamben’s philosophy will require that we turn to the idea of the ordinary, and 
in particular to a notion of it as a potential political achievement. This can help explain what he means 
when he writes in The Time that Remains of the possibility of a people “situat[ing] itself as a remnant, as 
not all” (55): Agamben’s ontology of the remnant — of what remains after the “Aufhebung of the state of 
exception” — is an attempt at thinking what it would mean to live and think beyond the Weltbild, of the 
world conceived as a representable totality. This, in turn, will show the link between the possibility of 
ontological change and the concrete political struggle for common happiness. Agamben’s repeated 
invocations of Paul’s referring in 1 Corinthians 7:31 to “the passing of the figure of this world” will 
from here appear in a new light: the time that remains is not the time that remains before the end of 
the world, but the time that remains before the end of the world-picture, before the passing of the 
skhēma of the world. 
 
 
Sabrina Achilles (University of Western Sydney, s.achilles@uws.edu.au) 
Literary Know-How 
 
This paper investigates the work of literature, in the sense of the job of literature, as that is to perform 
an ethics of the situation, or, in Francisco J. Varela’s terms, an ethics of “situatedness.” Varela refers to 
this ethics as a knowledge of know how, and not, know what — which he attributes to rational 
judgement (and which results in morals). Varela’s concept of an ethics of situatedness is a response to 
the idea that “proper units of knowledge are primarily concrete, embodied, incorporated, lived.” This 
contrasts to ethics and morality that are the result of abstraction and generalisations of prior lived 
events by rationalised judgement. Such knowledge overcodes flows and the event. Within the same 
paradigm as Varela’s ethics of situatedness is Deleuze and Guattari’s “meaning is use.” These are both 
instances of an ethics of immanence. Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis is a sizeable investment in 
an ethics of immanence. This paper, then, maps the two types of ethics stipulated by Varela upon 
Deleuze and Guattari’s molar aggregates and molecular/micro-multiplicities, that is, upon the socius 
and the BwO. It further considers how the literary may function as a schizoanalysis of the event, freeing 
into the world both the unconscious and an ethics of situatedness against a backdrop of moral judgment 
and striation. The object text in this paper is Hitchcock’s Vertigo. 
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Keith Ansell-Pearson (University of Warwick, keith.ansellpearson@btinternet.com) 
An Epicurean Attachment to Life: Nietzsche on Death 
 
This paper examines some of Nietzsche’s most essential thoughts on death and shows their Epicurean 
inspiration. For Nietzsche, Epicurus is a figure who was “true to the earth,” abandoning all hubristic 
conceptions of human significance, including exceptionalism, and who taught that one should die as if 
one had never lived. As Nietzsche astutely noted, never in the history of thought has such a voluptuous 
appreciation of existence been so modest. This paper will explore Nietzsche’s interpretation of Epicurus 
— whom he calls the inventor of “heroic-idyllic philosophizing” — and the nature of a Epicurean 
attachment to life.  
 
 
Yubraj Aryal (Purdue University, yaryal@purdue.edu) 
Identity as a Series of Affective Transactions  
 
In the traditionalist culturalist account, identity is often defined in terms of race, class and gender, and 
so on. And we have already produced numerous theoretical models to approach culture, politics and 
history, and their exercise in the formation of identity as effects of narrative seeing history “as a kind of 
production of various kinds of narratives.” But in this paper, I approach identity from another 
standpoint: the idea of “noncultural”/“nonnarrated” reality of affects from the position of Spinozan 
ethics of immanence. A Spinozan ethics of immanence defines ideas as the power of activity of the body. 
Here, I am trying to make a claim that the idea of our identity can be understood in terms of affectivity 
of the body rather than in terms of the conceptual abstractions of culture, history and politics. My sense 
of “noncultural” does not deny culture rather it expands culture’s horizon opening new fields for 
individuations and helps to analyze the content and expression of culture, which we often overlook. In 
so doing, I divide the paper into two sections: In the first section, I present the role of affects and bodies 
in identity formation; and in the second section, I present identity as an act of self-fashioning one’s own 
self as a self-relational interiority. 
 
 
Janice Baker (Deakin University, janice.baker@deakin.edu.au) 
De-facing the Subject: Deleuze, Cinematic Horror and the Wax Museum 
 
Deleuze and Guattari ask, “How can we unhook ourselves from the points of subjectification that 
secure us, nail us down to a dominant reality? Tearing the conscious away from the subject in order to 
make it a means of exploration.” This paper explores de-faciality as a cinematic image performing such 
an “unhooking.” From silent film to the present, images of violation in wax museums have engaged 
directly with an audience’s sensory perception of being. Through the multiple viewpoints synthesised 
by the cinema, affective realms of horror are created that do not correspond to the logic of familiar, 
organising systems of representation, particularly the melting face. When un-common “things” occur to 
the face in we are “shocked” away from a structure of order to an unrecognizable zone of fluid 
corporeal boundaries and shifting assemblages of the human. This effect of horror engages with 
Deleuze’s view that “if human beings have a destiny, it is rather to escape the face, to dismantle the face 
and facialisations, to become imperceptible.” The immediacy of affecting images, such as facial 
violation, act as a visceral response without particular reference to the armature of an individual 
viewer’s psychically structured world. It is in this sense that the act of dismantling the face — of de-
identifying the human visage — gestures towards a body-without-organs, and consequently a viewer 
unsettled from their subjective viewpoint as the stance that frames the world. 
 
 
Sreenanti Banerjee (Jadavpur University, Calcutta; sree_xaviers@yahoo.com) 
“Origin,” Heterogeneity and Performativity: A Feminist Approach 
 
This paper aims at studying the notions of “sexual difference” and “performativity” together, by 
elucidating their areas of congruence as well as divergence. Judith Butler, through her Theory of 
Performativity, alerts  
us towards an essentialist position that would conceive the materiality of the body preceding the 
symbolic order. Instead, she posits a conception of the body as “active materiality,” which in 
combination with discursive practices, works to constitute and reconstitute the body and thereby 
deontologize it from the naturalized notion of “sexual difference.” But, the most significant intellectual 
Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy Conference 2012 
! 8 
conundrum of the hour is, is there a political imperative to start off with sexual difference? And, in that 
case, what would such a notion of sexual difference entail, when it is stripped of all its integrity and 
essence? The aim of this paper is to address this paradox, where the notion of sexual difference 
certainly would not mean a return to the phenomenological understanding of it based on “experience,” 
“speech” and hence logos, but rather the very move to start off with the notion of the “displaced” 
woman is one of an ethical compulsion, than that of epistemic certitude. 
 
Here, sexual difference is conceived not in terms of a “metaphysics of presence,” but rather in terms of 
the dispersive, disseminatory and multiplicatory potential of Dasein or the khora, an unnameable womb-
like “embodied” non-space (a kind of non-origin, resisting anthropomorphism) existing prior to the 
namable form, hinting at the notion of “multiple singularities” that punctuate the notion of sexual 
difference, certainly resonating the notion of multiplicity. This move from parody or performativity to 
sexual difference as différance is extremely significant for feminist politics, a politics which grounds itself 
in the ever-lacking “present,” since mere mimesis or inverse performativity is certainly not enough to 
interrogate phallogocentrism. Parody must be doubly removed in order to open up the debate of ethics, 
since there is a political imperative to adhere to the notion of “sexual difference” as opposed to both 
sexual opposition as well as a kind of performativity which either reverts back to the logic of the 
promiscuous fragment or a foundational notion of convention, a move which writes “politics” back to 
the notion of undecidability. 
 
 
Charles Barbour (University of Western Sydney, c.barbour@uws.edu.au) 
The Bandit and the Ensign: Sovereignty and Secrecy in Agamben, Derrida, and Nancy 
 
This paper analyses Gerard David’s dyptic The Judgment of Cambyses and Shakespeare’s Othello as a way 
of exploring the relationship between sovereignty and secrecy in the early modern period, or at the 
dawn of modernity. I propose that the first provides a fairly clear illustration of what, following and 
augmenting Foucault, Agamben calls biopower and the sovereign ban. The second, however, 
represents an alternative to this model, or at least an aspect of modern social, political, and legal 
relations that Agamben’s work cannot quite capture or explain — specifically secrecy, and the manner 
in which social interaction is conditioned by a secrecy, and thus a faith or a trust, that eludes the logic 
of the sovereign ban. In order to provide this point (or conjecture) with some theoretical and 
philosophical heft, I conclude with a discussion of Derrida’s treatment of the oath, and compare it with 
Agamben’s recent consideration of the same topic in The Sacrament of Language. 
 
 
A. J. Bartlett (University of Melbourne, ajbar@unimelb.edu.au) 
Education: The Four Discourses 
 
The question of education is central to philosophical inquiry, precisely because philosophy interrogates 
the status and conditions of knowledge and the terms and means of its transmission. This paper utilises 
Alain Badiou’s reconfiguration of the distinction between “truth” and “knowledge” to explicate the four 
discursive strands of education discourse — epistemology, pastoralism, politics, psychology — and 




Jai Bentley-Payne (University of Auckland, jai.bentley-payne@auckland.ac.nz) 
The Subject of Decision 
 
With a world in perpetual crisis the situation calls for philosophy to think the problem of change. 
Moreover, it is important to look again at the so-called agent of change and consider the question of the 
subject. The politico-citizen subject, the transcendental, the ego and the interpellated subject can all be 
reduced to the individual against the world. Politics under these terms is presented through the banality 
of choice as a mere inventory of bodies. Through the work of Alain Badiou, I will argue conversely that 
radical politics be considered via the rubric of the event. The subject, says Badiou, is rare. However, 
this rareness does not preclude enumerable instances of possibility for subjectivation. The situation can 
always be exceeded, and therefore the conditions must be created for the possibility of genuine change. 
In this way, radical politics can be understood as a movement of subjectivation that cannot be reduced 
to the individual. A political ontology reveals a subject in process, an operation that is at once localised 
and universal. Of particular interest is the role of decision in subjectivation. At the boundary of a 
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possible-impossible aporia, a political subject is wrought by decision, confronted in the absence of choice. 
Subjectivation is sequenced between the mediating idea and the undecidable border of a situation. 
Crafting a determinate affirmation for the undecidable is vital for the project of radical politics today. 
 
 
Lauren Bliss (University of Melbourne, lauren.bliss@unimelb.edu.au) 
Pregnant Resistance: Masao Adachi’s A Gushing Prayer [Film Philosophy Panel] 
 
This paper examines the relatively unknown film A Gushing Prayer (1971), or prayer for ejaculation, by 
Japanese filmmaker and activist Masao Adachi. The film offers a cross-examination of the struggle 
against the American occupation of Japan in the mid-twentieth century to ask the question: how is it 
possible to escape the perceived totality of history and of capitalism? While Adachi’s philosophy of the 
cinema echoes the writings of the Situationist movement and their notion of détournement, A Gushing 
Prayer ultimately figures the cinema as that which produces “a repetition and a continuity” (Adachi 
2003). In discussing the notion of the figural in relationship to the work of film theorist Nicole Brenez, 
who borrows Giorgio Agamben’s notion of the “coming community,” this paper will address the films 
figuration of both the pregnant body and the prostitute as a site of paradoxical resistance. 
 
 
Geoff Boucher (Deakin University, geoff.boucher@deakin.edu.au) 
Futures of Marxism 
 
This paper proposes that Marxism, as a set of theoretical research programmes linked to emancipatory 
agendas arising from specifically capitalist forms of oppression, will remain a central part of twenty-first 
century radical thought. Of course, invocations of both the recent death of Marxism and the spectral 
persistence of Marx are an intellectual commonplace of the early twenty-first century. On the Right, 
Marx is supposed to be directly responsible for the atrocities of Stalin and Mao, so that the catastrophe 
of historical Communism demonstrates that Marxism has failed. On the Left, meanwhile, “Marx” as a 
signifier is a safe bet, defining radical intentions that can be linked to the most astonishing positions, 
while Marxism has become identified with political voluntarism. But Marx as an unsystematic genius 
betrayed by a series of ideologues is as flimsy as the idea of Lenin as a modernist Saint Paul. What, then, 
are the futures of Marx, and Marxism, outside of journalistic commentary, rhetorical posturing and 
intellectual dilettantism? This paper proposes that the collapse of historical Communism released 
intellectual energies around three major reconstructions of Marxism, and three continuations of 
regional agendas in Marxist research, whose full effects have not yet been felt. Here we see Marx/ism 
as something other than a current in social theory of only historical interest or an empty signifier in the 
culture wars. The normative dimension of Marxist theory, a political philosophy of post-capitalist 
society, new empirically-grounded descriptions of capitalist economics are among recent contributions, 
although the articulation between class and politics remains as difficult as before. 
 
 
Sean Bowden (Deakin University, s.bowden@deakin.edu.au) 
Tragic Agency in Deleuze and Hegel 
 
The aim of this paper is to clarify the early Deleuze’s references to the tragedies of Oedipus and Hamlet in 
his thinking about agency and action. I will examine the points of convergence and divergence between 
these references and the way in which Hegel turns to tragedy in order to understand action and agency. 
I will show that, for both Deleuze and Hegel, tragedy brings into focus three aspects of action and 
agency: retrospectivity, theatricality and heroism. Retrospectivity means that we only understand what 
we are doing and intending after the fact. Theatricality refers to the way in which action takes place in 
public space, such that our understanding of what we do and intend is inseparable from how we appear 
to others. Finally, the heroic character of action and agency refers to an agent’s holding itself 
responsible, and being held responsible, for doings which outstrip what he or she intends and can know. 
The main point of divergence between Deleuze’s and Hegel’s tragic conceptions of agency will then be 
brought out with reference to way in which the difference between the agent’s perspective on her 
intentions-actions and the perspective of others on these intentions-actions (the difference constitutive of 
the heroic character of action and agency) is dealt with. In Hegel, this difference is understood to be 
overcome within a recognitive community structured by “forgiveness.” In Deleuze, by contrast, there is 
no necessary overcoming and reconciliation of perspectives. 
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Daniel Brennan (Bond University, dbrennan@bond.edu.au) 
Jan Patocka’s Understanding of Sacrifice and Jiri Menzel’s Films 
 
My paper will explore the notion of sacrifice in the films of Jiri Menzel, focusing on Closely Watched 
Trains and Larks on a String. It is my contention that Menzel’s films are an excellent counterpoint to 
exploring, and explaining the idea of sacrifice in the work of his compatriot philosopher, Jan Patocka. 
For Patocka, sacrifice is an essential feature of dissent, because the dissident recognises that a life not 
willing to sacrifice itself to what makes it meaningful is not living. It is in the dissident themes of 
Menzel’s films, produced under late socialist conditions, that the link can be made between the 
philosophy of Patocka on the one hand and the films of Menzel on the other. 
 
 
Justin Clemens (University of Melbourne, jclemens@unimelb.edu.au) 
Vomit Apocalypse [Apocalypse Today Panel] 
 
One of the most interesting features of the emergent philosophical genre of speculative realism is its 
apocalyptic rhetoric, which ranges from invocations of the total extinction of the universe to object-
oriented interpretations of Lovecraftian horror. As Ray Brassier puts it in the conclusion to his Nihil 
Unbound: ‘the subject of philosophy must also recognize that he or she is already dead, and that 
philosophy is neither a medium of affirmation nor a source of justification, but rather the organon of 
extinction.” This magnificent statement is echoed, in a minor key, by thinkers such as Graham 
Harman and Quentin Meillassoux, who speak, for example, of “hyperchaos” and the irrevocable 
“weirdness” of the real. Another noteworthy hallmark of this genre is its constitutive anti-Kantianism, 
under such derogatory slogans as “correlationism.” This paper examines these two interlinked features 
of speculative realism — essentially, its apocalyptic anti-Kantianism — by returning to the untenable 
presuppositions with which speculative realism begins. These are, first and foremost, its scientism, its 
return to a single principle as the fons et origo of thought (e.g., the principle of non-contradiction), and its 
suppression of the subject. The paper draws its argumentation from the conceptual figure of vomit from 
Jacques Derrida’s “Economimesis.” 
 
 
Byron Clugston (University of Sydney, byron.clugston@sydney.edu.au) 
An Hegelian Dialectical Exposition of Kant’s Principle of Complete Determination 
 
In this paper I discuss the “principle of complete determination” from “The Ideal of Pure Reason.” 
The employment of this principle is involved with the generation of, among other things, the idea of the 
ens realissimum (“most real being”), which has been referred to as the “philosophical kernel of the idea of 
God.” I engage with Beatrice Longuenesse’s exemplary account of the principle, and her claim that it is 
grounded in the idealist logical structures of infinite judgment, disjunctive judgment, and the synthetic 
unity of apperception. Longuenesse’s basic conclusion is that the ens realissimum should be understood as 
grounding determination relative to the “world of sense,” and therefore under the conditions of possible 
experience. This runs counter to some prominent readings of Kant’s intentions in this section.  I 
develop implications of Longuenesse’s reading for the Kant-Hegel relation, by subjecting the elements 
of transcendental logic underlying the principle to an Hegelian exposition. The result is revelation of 
what “God” could not mean for Hegel. I also recommend a positive interpretation of Hegel’s idea of 
God, by linking Hegel’s reflections on the concept of the “I,” in the Introduction to the Subjective 
Logic, with Kant’s conception of the “I think” in the B Deduction. This theme is clarified further by 
recalling Hegel’s discussion of self-consciousness and recognition in “The Truth of Self-Certainty” from 
the Phenomenology of Spirit. 
 
 
Jordan Collins (University of Auckland, jordanelijahcollins@gmail.com) 
Heidegger on Husserl’s Concept of Truth 
 
In this paper I investigate to what extent Martin Heidegger takes on Edmund Husserl’s concept of truth 
as presented in the Logical Investigations. Heidegger claims that Husserl presents the most important and 
rigorous theory of truth as correspondence in modernity. This theory provides the backdrop against 
which Heidegger develops his more primordial conception of truth as Being-uncovering (Entdeckensein) 
in Dasein’s disclosure (Erschlossenheit). In this paper, contrary Ernst Tugendhat’s famous critique, I argue 
that Heidegger’s ontological considerations provide a deepening of — rather than radical disagreement 
with — Husserl’s theory of truth as evidence. The confusion in the literature regarding Heidegger’s 
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relation to Husserl’s notion of truth stems from the platonistic tendencies of Husserl’s Prolegomena to 
the Logical Investigations. These tendencies cover over the most important aspects of Husserl’s theory; 
they provide the sole point of difference in Husserl and Heidegger’s accounts of truth. In fact, 
Heidegger’s ontologizing of truth is a natural deepening of Husserl’s theory and simply demonstrates 
that Husserl’s platonism is incompatible with his own theory of truth as evidence. 
 
 
Jane Connell (University of Melbourne, jane.connell@alumni.unimelb.edu.au) 
The Second Journey of Hegel’s Master and Slave: Morphing Down the Twentieth Century  
 
The renown of Hegel’s master-slave dyad, intensified in the wake of Kojève’s reading, is not matched 
by curiosity about the way the trope per se functions within subsequent thought. Rarely subject to 
rigorous critique, it is frequently deployed as a tool for critique. If, a propos of Hegel’s master-slave 
narrative, we eschew enlightenment notions of scientific thinking and take it, with Derrida and Bataille, 
as myth or legend, then Hegel’s choice of such limited, belligerent, paranoid characters is significant, as 
are the resonances of the particular imaginary — à la Sartre rather than the more restricted Lacanian 
sense — that informs the story. As this maladroit couple wends its way down the last century, it makes a 
second journey independent of that of the subject of Phenomenology of Spirit. In this paper, which forms 
part of project to examine the imaginaries of critical theory, something of the path of this trope is traced. 
The refiguring of the master-slave dyad in influential, popular and even popularised texts of the 
twentieth century, including those of Sartre and de Beauvoir, is read to illustrate the resistances and 
contortions used to avoid destabilisation of this trope as the necessity to include the woman as a subject 
increases. The direct interpolation of the woman’s subjectivity, a propos the master-slave dyad, into the 
Lacanian schema via one of its central tenets, the mirror stage is read to expose the malignity of an 
unchallenged misogyny and homophobia. 
 
 
Ian Cook (Murdoch University, i.cook@murdoch.edu.au) 
Voyaging In Smooth Space: The Politics of Nomads in the Age of the Corporation 
 
Using Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of nomadism requires understanding their philosophy of space 
and movement. Much contemporary work misunderstands Deleuze and Guattari’s work on space-time. 
This is dangerous, in that it fails to account for the ways the corporation (capitalism) uses and creates 
smooth space, which is the domain of the nomad. We do not intend that the notion of nomadism be 
abandoned, however, but that it be understood differently. The paper is in three parts. First, we outline 
Deleuze and Guattari’s geophilosophical notions of nomadism, States and war machines and the 
associated concepts of smooth and striated space. Then we discuss appropriations of nomadism to 
illustrate the romanticisation of nomads as contemporary figures of disruption and resistance. Third, we 
argue that this appropriation both misunderstands space in Deleuze and Guattari and serves no critical 
function when the rigid lines of the State have been overlaid by the “transmutable or transformable 
coded configurations” of the late-modern corporation (Deleuze 1995: 181). While much of the paper is 
a critical account of the misappropriation of nomadism, we explore both the ways that nomadism 
presents new machines and logics of capture and escape. Engaging with questions of utility reveals 
possibilities with respect to lines of flight and probe-heads, while acknowledging the risk of potential 
psychosis, prestigious death and/or reterritorialisation on reterritorialisation. 
 
 
Neal Curtis (University of Auckland; n.curtis@auckland.ac.nz) 
Idiotism and the Politics of Knowledge 
 
The dominance of neoliberalism requires us to think about how this primarily economic ideology has 
come to flood the entire social field creating a pervasive (and all-consuming) culture that privileges the 
private, the individual and the market. In this paper, this condition is referred to as idiotism, taken from 
the Greek word idios, meaning private. With regards to the politics of knowledge the argument pursues 
two specific and related trajectories. The first argues that idiotism should not be thought of as a 
condition born of stupidity, nor is our condition a case of false consciousness. Idiotism is an ontological 
condition as much as it is an epistemological one. The paper therefore uses the writings of Martin 
Heidegger to show how idiotism exaggerates our absorption in the world, explaining why we might be 
critical and yet still continue with the everyday routines that feed neoliberalism. Secondly, idiotism is 
maintained through a politics of description in which claims to truth seek to invalidate alternative views. 
As an important institution in the production of truth this takes us to the role of the university and the 
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ways in which idiotism seeks to entrain academics and scholars to the truths of market fundamentalism 
via customer service, impact statements, and internal competition. All of this is regulated and managed 
by the discourse of “realism” that claims market principles to be the only solution.  
 
 
Bregham Dalgliesh (University of Tokyo, dalgliesh@global.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp) 
Foucault’s Critical History of Thought 
 
This paper argues that, in heeding Kant’s call for a philosophical archæology of reason that is framed 
against Nietzsche’s ontological priority of power, it is possible to speak of a Foucauldian œuvre called 
critical history. Based on this method, Foucault excavates the domains of thought through which we 
experience ourselves and which limit who we are. It implies the task of critique is to make the will to 
know that drives thought conscious of itself as a problem, with a focus on the apparatuses of 
power/knowledge via which we are constituted as subjects but within which domination is always 
possible. By revealing these apparatuses to be contingent rather than necessary, it is argued that 
Foucault’s Kantian derived and Nietzschean inspired critical history of thought fosters a transformative 
critique on behalf of the autonomy of the subject. Finally, it is shown that those critics who dismiss 
Foucault’s work insofar as it lacks coherence and suffers from internal contradictions are mistaken 
precisely because they fail to acknowledge the possibility of alternative forms of critique, especially that 
of critical history, as well as of a conception of the subject as a construction of the power/technoscience 
relations that define our ontological condition. 
 
 
Hugh Davies (LaTrobe University/Monash University, hdavies@latrobe.edu.au) 
Monetising the Apocalypse [Apocalypse Today Panel] 
 
According to an apocryphal tale from the 2011 Occupy Wall Street protests, executives peering down 
on from their offices high in Goldman Sachs were said to have speculated: How can we make money 
from this? True or otherwise, this story speaks of the unwavering determination to snatch opportunity 
from the teeth of adversity that has so defined contemporary capitalism. From the Left, the end of 
capitalism is repeatedly predicted, yet its invincibility is such that it has managed to survive even its own 
demise in the form of the Global Financial Crisis. Indeed, this crisis appears to have rendered it 
stronger. The same might be said of the series of disasters that have set an apocalyptic tone over the last 
decade have brought about institutionalisation of a new and lucrative investment sector, that of disaster 
capitalism. Across Iraq and Afghanistan, from post-tsunami Sri Lanka to post-Katrina New Orleans, 
disaster capitalism generates profits by feeding off other peoples’ misery, generated through wars, terror 
attacks, poverty, trade sanctions, market crashes and all kinds of economic, environmental, and 
political disasters. Within this catastrophic configuration, it seems evident that the capitalism dynamic 
wont simply survive an apocalypse, it will profit from it. Considering writings from Slavoj Zizek’s Living 
in the End Times and Naomi Klein’s The Shock Doctrine this paper explores disaster capitalism’s ability to 
survive the End of Days. 
 
 
Jean-Philippe Deranty (Macquarie University, jp.deranty@mq.edu.au) 
Rancière’s Paradoxical Materialism [Rancière Panel] 
 
Rancière’s interpretation of aesthetic modernity relies upon an extension of the egalitarian axiom into 
the realms of expression and representation. This extension is made possible by the fact that the 
political axiom of radical equality, by suspending the links between political voice and social place, in 
fact unsettles the very ontology of the social order, and impacts in turn on the expressive practices that 
are rooted in it. Radical equality does not just undermine hierarchical principles that serve to rank 
social bodies, discursive genres and objects of representation alike, but also the very logic of necessary, 
or natural, assignation. The disruptive work of equality applies to the very separations between orders 
of reality, for instance between different expressive media, or indeed between the ideal and the material. 
This work of ontological disruption, however, ends up as little in political indecision as it does in an 
aesthetic of indefinite suspension. In fact, it grounds a paradoxical materialist perspective, one that 
looks at political action and artistic practice in terms of limited and fallible operations to restructure a 
field of experience, introduce a temporary grammar between words and things, some local form of 
sense. I study three examples of this practical, paradoxical materialism in Rancière’s writings: in the 
case of work; the reading of Rimbaud’s poetry, and the interpretation of Lang’s cinema. 
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Max Deutscher (Macquarie University/University of Queensland, maxwell.deutscher@mq.edu.au) 
Judgment: From Deeming to Sentencing 
 
Judgment should not be arbitrary and yet it is a work of arbitration. I consider whether all judgments 
are sentences, and whether all sentences are judgments. If one is to judge, one must be prepared to 
deem something to deserve a certain epithet — or that a concept may rightly be stretched to fit a case. 
The paper traverses domestic, political and legal judgments. Attention is paid to the Australian High 
Court’s “Mabo” case concerning native title. My thesis is that judgment, while subject to constraints of 
objectivity, essentially involves “being pleased at” some aspect of how things are, or should be. 
 
 
Andrew Donnelly (University of Sydney, adon1462@uni.sydney.edu.au) 
Conscience as Ideal Moral Self-Conception 
 
There are two main ways of thinking about the conscience in ethics. The first way of thinking about 
conscience holds that the conscience just is the capacity to make moral judgments. This is the account 
defended by Moore and Butler, for example. The second way of thinking about conscience connects 
the conscience with authenticity to self or identity. This approach is exemplified in the accounts of 
Heidegger and Arendt. In this paper I articulate an account that mediates between these two ways of 
thinking about conscience. I name this account of conscience “ideal moral self-conception.” On this 
account a judgment of conscience is a judgment about whether some past or proposed action is 
consistent with an agent’s conception of the ideal moral self: that judgment as to the sort of person you 
judge that you morally ought to be. I offer two reasons as to why my account should be preferred to the 
other two: First, it best explains our common intuitions about conscience. Second, it gives the best 
justification for rights of conscientious objection. 
 
 
Simone Drichel (University of Otago, simone.drichel@otago.ac.nz) 
Narcissus on the Postcolonial Couch: A Levinasian Analysis 
 
In an early essay, Levinas explicitly aligns Western philosophy’s preoccupation with autonomy — as 
that which “aims to ensure the freedom, or the identity, of beings” — with the solipsistic self-absorption 
of Narcissus. And yet, no sooner has Narcissus made his entrance than he disappears again: unlike 
fellow Grecian Odysseus, for example, who remains a permanent fixture in the Levinasian universe, 
Narcissus is instantly returned to oblivion. This paper begins from the premise that, Narcissus’s fleeting 
appearance notwithstanding, the Levinasian oeuvre may productively be read as an attempt to break 
free from the entrapment in self-absorption that is Narcissus’s pathological legacy. Understanding “the 
Western idea of freedom [as] a defense against narcissistic humiliation” (Alford 121), I propose that the 
liberation from such pathological narcissism in turn gives rise to a new understanding of freedom: a 
freedom that is not, as in the case of Narcissus, mortiferous, but rather generative of ethical life. 
Translating Levinas’s ethical treatment of pathological narcissism into a postcolonial context—the very 
context in which Narcissus’s “imperialism of the same” is arguably most overt and destructive—the 
paper frames the colonial encounter as an encounter between Narcissus and Echo. It suggests that the 
life-affirming dimension of what Gayatri Spivak calls their “deconstructive embrace” only becomes 
possible once Narcissus’s psychic wound is (ad)dressed via Levinasian analysis. 
 
 
Grant Duncan (Massey University, L.G.Duncan@massey.ac.nz) 
“Be a good subject!” How Are the Sovereign and the Subject Mutually Constitutive? 
 
I begin with a hypothesis about subjectivity: that “to be is to be ruled.” As this implies that the subject 
would be the mere product of relations of power, the opening hypothesis is soon scuttled; but it serves 
to provoke reflection about subjectivities in and of the polis, or believable “identities” — and about that 
exceptional kind of subjectivity called “sovereign.” The aim is to consider the subject and the sovereign 
as mutually constitutive. For the subject to adopt the place of citizen with a recognisable “identity” — 
or to be denied it — a sovereign power is at work. But the sovereign requires a “people” — a collective 
of recognizable subjects — in order to instantiate its rule. And, if we can decentre the subject, we may 
decentre the sovereign too. Sovereignty and subjectivity depend upon one another, as one answers to 
the desire of the other. A psychoanalytical theory of transference can help here. The subject’s “Che 
vuoi?” (What do you want?) is distantly echoed in the Sovereign’s “Chi sei?” (Who are you?), forming a 
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powerful relation of identification. Being sovereign (ruling) and being a person (living) are mutually 
authorising and defining sets of actions. They are mutually constitutive ontologically (as we turn a blind 
eye to what’s missing), thus forming a politico-legal constitution. 
 
 
Joanne Faulkner (University of New South Wales, j.faulkner@unsw.edu.au) 
Imaginary Childhoods and Fabricated Memories: The Politics of Identification in Wilkomirski’s Fragments  
 
In 1995, the publication of Binjamin Wilkomirski’s memoir, Fragments: Memories of a Wartime Childhood, 
represented a first for holocaust literature. An autobiographical account of a young child’s internment 
and torture in concentration camps, the author’s survival was thought to be incredible, and the clarity 
of his depictions of fragmentary childhood memory impressive. Before long the best-selling book was 
uncovered as a fraud: Wilkomirski’s name was actually Bruno Grosjean, he had grown up in 
Switzerland, and was not even Jewish. The Jewish intellectual community’s response to this deception 
was divided: while many felt betrayed — that Jewish suffering had been hijacked and trivialized — 
others held that the account was still of literary value, and revealed something of the holocaust 
experience, despite its inaccuracies and fraudulent origin. This paper will use Fragments as a starting 
point for reflection on the seductiveness of representations of wounded childhood in literature, and the 
work that such representations perform in managing ambivalence about one’s own social privilege. Not 
only in accounts of the holocaust, but also for representations of the removal of Aboriginal children, 
identification with the child — as protagonist, observer, and victim — serves an important, yet ethically 
precarious role in negotiating our responsibilities to past injustice. 
 
 
Fraisopi Fausto (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Germany; faustofraisopi@gmail.com) 
The Quasi-Ontology of “An Sich”: Bernard Bolzano’s Theory of Science between Leibnitzian Ars Combinatoria and 
the Husserlian Idea of Mathesis Universalis 
 
Starting from the critical position that Husserl assumes against Bolzano and his idea of mathesis 
universalis, this paper focuses and emphasizes Bolzano’s project for a mathesis and the differences between 
this project and Leibniz’s. Putting into an historical perspective these three forms of mathesis, by Leibniz, 
Bolzano, and Husserl, we/I open in so doing a theoretical perspective concerning the non-ontological 
dimension of idealities they form and articulate mathesis as such. The an-ontological Combinatorics of 
propositions and of ideas in themselves, suggests, Bolzano maintains, the possibility of a treatment of 
combinatorics independently from these ontological and metaphysical presuppositions that formed and 
structured the Leibnitian ars combinatoria. In this sense, the philosophical position of a “semantic 
Platonism,” assumed by Bolzano, opens the perspective of a non-metaphysical but modular mathesis that 
we can articulate and widen beyond an ontological commitment. 
 
 
Ian Fookes (University of Auckland/Université de Paris 8; ifoo001@aucklanduni.ac.nz) 
Victor Segalen’s Exoticism in the Context of Phenomenology 
 
At the outset of the twentieth century, Victor Segalen (1878-1919), a French naval doctor, novelist, 
archaeologist and poet reinvented the nineteenth century notion of exoticism. Returning to a 
“[d]efinition from the prefix Exo in its broadest possible generalization,” he rejected cliché notions of 
the exotic as essentially tropical and geographically distant from Europe. Exoticism “is not that 
kaleidoscope of the tourist and the mediocre spectator, but the lively and curious reaction to the shock 
of a strong individuality against an objectivity, of which it perceives and tastes the distance.” From this 
starting point, he developed his ideas into an “aesthetics of diversity” [une esthétique du divers], which has 
been alternatively read as paradoxical and dogged by its own relativism, or as a coherent theory of 
Being prefiguring that of Martin Heidegger. The paper introduces Segalen’s exoticism in terms of its 
philosophical influences (Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Jules de Gaultier) and then discusses the above 
interpretations of his work in relation to the following question: Does reading Segalen’s exoticism in the 
context of an emergent phenomenology help us to reconcile competing interpretations of his poetics. 
 
 
Veronique Foti (Pennsylvania State University, vmf3@psu.edu) 
Painterly and Phenomenological Interpretation in Merleau-Ponty’s “Eye and Mind” 
 
Abstract not available at time of printing. 
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Richard Ganis (Lahore University of Management Sciences, Pakistan; richard.ganis@lums.edu.pk) 
Eros and Its Discontents: On the Taming (and Un-taming) of Love in Habermas, Derrida, and Honneth 
 
In the tradition of Kant, the attitude of loving benevolence is kept at express conceptual and structural 
remove from the public use of reason and its cognate principles of tolerative reciprocity, such that the 
particularism of the former is barred from “infecting” the impartial universalism of the latter. 
Notwithstanding, neo-Kantian discourse ethicists such as Jürgen Habermas have made various 
attempts to nudge the asymmetrical orientation of affective concern for the welfare of the other within 
the normative orbit of universal justice. Their aim is to guard against the prospect of “banalization,” 
which we invite when we anchor moral discourse in an appeal to “dialogical reasonableness” alone. 
While sympathetic to this objective, the recognition theory of Axel Honneth breaks with Habermas and 
his collaborators: it seeds the orientation of caring recognition into the conceptual and genetic core of 
all intelligent problem-solving languages and their associated spheres of life. Here Honneth blurs the 
boundary between detached cognition and love for the irreducibly singular other, evincing a surprising 
affinity with the deconstructive care ethics of Jacques Derrida, which likewise invites the possibility of 
an all-pervasive phenomenology of recognitional experience. This paper offers a qualified defense of 
the epistemological convictions of Habermas’s discourse model, which draws the line between love and 
morality rather more sharply than Honneth and Derrida have done. 
 
 
Paul Giladi (University of Sheffield, p.giladi@shef.ac.uk) 
Moving from Transcendental Logic to Dialectical Logic  
 
Up until the 1980s, the general consensus in both Kant and Hegel scholarship was to emphasise the 
fundamental differences between the two philosophers. The differences were emphasised so much so 
that many were inclined to view Kant and Hegel as polar opposites. However, since that time, some 
philosophers began to read Kant and Hegel as sharing a lot in common. Though, the way in which the 
positive relationship between these two philosophers can be cashed out appears to be ambiguous: one 
way of viewing Hegel’s debt to Kant is made famous by Pippin (1989). This school of thought interprets 
Hegel as working entirely within Kant’s transcendental constraints. Hegel, according to Pippin et al., 
should be understood as offering his own idiosyncratic version of transcendental idealism, for he is only 
interested in uncovering the necessary a priori structures for possible experience and is not committed 
to any kind of metaphysical enquiry. The second way of viewing Hegel’s debt to Kant, unlike the 
Pippinian reading, aims to interpret Hegel as developing Kant’s transcendental insights into domains 
that Kant either restricted himself from entering or those domains that Kant did not address. This 
school of thought finds notable support in the work of Bristow (2007). Those who share Bristow’s broad 
view maintain that Hegel was supportive of Kant despite rejecting transcendental idealism. However, 
what is crucial here is that Hegel’s rejection of transcendental idealism does not obviously rule out the 
possibility of Hegel being bound to transcendental philosophy itself. My aim in this paper, therefore, is 
to suggest a way of regarding Hegel as a transcendental philosopher, one that stresses its Kantian 
influence without reducing it to Kantianism. 
 
 
Hal Ginges (University of Western Sydney, gingeses@bigpond.net.au) 
Rudolf Steiner and the Limits to Knowledge 
 
Rudolf Steiner is well known as the founder of Waldorf education and biodynamic agriculture, but not 
as a philosopher. In his early career, however, Steiner was a neo-Kantian who sought to demonstrate 
that we have access to knowledge of essences. Steiner extrapolated from Goethe’s Urphenomen to claim 
that we do possess an intellectus archetypus and Fichte’s intellectual intuition to argue for what he called 
“intuitive thinking.” This paper outlines Steiner’s arguments as a series of disjunctions from the 
epistemological propositions of the critical philosophy. 
 
 
Dominic Griffiths (University of Auckland, dgri051@aucklanduni.ac.nz) 
Early and Later Heidegger and the Question Concerning Authenticity 
 
There is a seemingly intractable difficulty in the core of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy, which 
concerns the question of authenticity. Heidegger’s early work, particularly Being and Time, develops a 
fairly robust concept of authenticity that is centred round the individual’s experience of anxiety and 
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knowledge of his or her death. For the most part each of us lives in the mode of inauthenticity, 
absorbed in everyday living, oblivious or sometimes even deliberately fleeing in the face of our 
individual finitudes. Yet, through moments of illumination and bewilderment, “moments of vision,” the 
existential condition of human being is crystallized and an individual becomes authentic, attuned to the 
finite nature of his or her own individual existence. This experience is characterised initially by anxiety, 
but, for Heidegger, this emotion can give way to resoluteness, essentially a genuine appropriation of 
fate and the limited nature of existence. In Heidegger’s later work he abandons the language of Being 
and Time. No longer is the individual either held out to the nothing in “moments of vision” or levelled 
down to the general conformity that everyday existence demands. Instead our existence is 
mythologized and drawn into a richer relationship with other elements that surround and sustain us. 
Our mortality, instead of representing the void of beinglessness, becomes the way each person is 
enmeshed into a broader community that extends before and after his or her individual life has ended. 
Essentially mortality is a gift that binds the individual to a community of fellow dwellers. My question is 
whether we can, in some ways, appropriate the language of authenticity in the early Heidegger and find 
continuity with it in the later. For many interpreters of Heidegger this not possible, yet as a whole 
Heidegger’s philosophy, whether explicitly or implicitly, is always concerned with the meaning of an 
authentic life, and what the most genuine response is to the living of it. The aim of the paper will be to 
explore this question more fully. 
 
 
Mike Grimshaw (University of Canterbury, michael.grimshaw@canterbury.ac.nz) 
Vattimo: The Political Flaneur of Weak Thought 
 
This paper rethinks the future of continental philosophy of religion through a central, annotative 
reading of Gianni Vattimo’s Not Being God (2010). The reading undertaken develops from Agamben on 
citation (2005) and Zizek on the short-circuit (2003) into a new reading strategy of annotation that is 
viewed as a development of weak thought. It argues for what is termed the flanerie of the weak thought 
of annotation, rethinking the future of continental philosophy of religion as para-thought. The future 
envisioned is a future that flaneurs, annotates and is para- to both the religious and laicity and their 
associated strong claims and metaphysics. For Vattimo weak thought helps us see that if we read 
Nietzsche as an announcement and not a claim, hermeneutics teaches us we cannot conceive ultimate 
objective truths. Therefore, after Heidegger, we reach the end of metaphysics and the age of weak 
thought, where we respond only to appeals and announcements. The paper that follows is developed 
from one delivered at Postmodernism, Culture and Religion: “The Future of Continental Philosophy of 
Religion,” Syracuse University April 7-9, 2011. Before I address the issue of “continental drift,” I 
engage with Vattimo’s The Responsibility of the Philosopher (2000) and his A Farewell to Truth (2011). It 
concludes, following the central section of “continental drift,” with a response to hermeneutic 
communism as Vattimo (with Zabala) himself flaneurs, against the crowds of neo-liberalism. 
 
 
Simone Gustafsson (University of Melbourne, simoneleegustafsson@gmail.com) 
The Ambiguity of Indistinction: Animal Being in Agamben and Merleau-Ponty 
 
Giorgio Agamben’s concept of homo sacer or bare life is grounded in part by the distinction between bios, 
politically qualified life, and zoē, the Greek term that “expressed the simple fact of living common to all 
living beings” (Homo Sacer 1). This distinction as it functions in Agamben’s texts, however, remains 
ambiguous. The concept of zoē itself, and that of the “natural” remains largely undetermined in 
Agamben’s analyses. At times the notion of zoē appears proximate to a vitalist conception of an 
elemental essence, substance or spirit common to all living beings that grounds the very possibility of 
political existence. It is posited as a formless life or living matter from which something like the way of 
life or bios can emerge, in the sense that it functions as the presupposition for the latter. On the other 
hand, in order for zoē to be at stake in modern biopolitics, it must in a sense already be given to bios; 
“natural” life as formulated in Agamben’s homo sacer must always already contain the possibility for 
politicization. It must already be exposed. This paper seeks to explore this conceptual ambiguity and 
the ramifications of this indistinction for an account of animal being or animality in Agamben’s work. It 
will argue that animal being is “doubly” excluded; animality cannot be subject to the “ban” and is in 
fact barred from the political. It will conclude with a discussion of animal being as conceptualized in the 
work of Merleau-Ponty, whose texts offer a more productive and open account of animal life. 
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Ben Hjorth (Monash University, ben.hjorth@gmail.com) 
“Spirit When Acting Appears . . .”: Tracing the Performative in the Phenomenology of Spirit 
 
This paper seeks to address what Judith Butler and Catherine Malabou have termed “the problem of 
the body” in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, by attending to the echoes and implications of performance 
in the text. It first identifies the ambiguous, split status of both body and self in early Hegelian ontology 
and methodology. Many of Hegel’s embodied “models,” or shapes of Spirit, are characters drawn from 
theatre; most notably the much-debated, mourned and maligned body of Antigone. As such the paper 
argues that theatrical character, modelling a synthesis or sublation of form and content which proves 
crucial to the narrative of developing Spirit, holds a key to the Hegelian conception of body and self. In 
this framework, the dialectic (dialogue) of Lordship and Bondage is to be seen as precisely a staging of 
the emergence of character itself, and thus implicates a specifically performing body at this moment of 
Spirit’s self-consciousness. This leads, finally, to an outline of a conception of the performing body as 
one defined by fluid and paradoxical relationships between its own body and self/selves, and the bodies 
and selves of Others. This conception is situated in fruitful relation with recent readings of the Hegelian 
subject as “ecstatic” (Butler) and “plastic” (Malabou). Paradoxically, this paper suggests, performative 
models of the subject may indeed point to ways out, even a “letting-go” [Aufgeben], of the problem(s) of 
the body in Hegel. 
 
 
Joanna Hodge (Manchester Metropolitan University, j.hodge@mmu.ac.uk) 
From Experience to Excription: J.L. Nancy and the Experience of Freedom 
 
The motto: “liberty, equality, fraternity” seems to us somewhat ridiculous and difficult to introduce into 
philosophical discourse, because in France it remains official (a lie of the State) and because it is said to 
summarise an obsolete Rousseauism. The Experience of Freedom is a text published by Jean-Luc Nancy in 
1988. It consists in thirteen sections, with an additional section fourteen, under the non-thematic title, 
“Fragments,” in which Nancy addresses various questions posed to its author, presumably in the course 
of its examination for the Doctorat d’état. Between section thirteen and section fourteen there is a marked 
shift of register, an exploration of which will be begun in this contribution. The shift is from the neutral 
all-seeing “we” of authoritative discourse, to the immediate authorial “I,” which seeks to respond to 
questions posed, presumably by the examiners. The differences between authorial “I,” the all-seeing 
“we” and the “being in common” of the liberty in dispute are the distinct registers which impose the 
fragment form of the fourteenth section. This contribution will begin to open out the implications of 
these shifts of register, in order the better to locate the implications for the task of philosophy of these 
transitions. In the concluding paragraph the activity of transcription is invoked and this contribution 
will offer an account of the emergence by contrast of the notion of excription. 
 
 
Kevin Houser (Indiana University, klhouser@indiana.edu) 
Suffering + Separation = Solidarity: How Levinasian Alterity Becomes Ethical Proximity 
 
Present Levinas scholarship says much about what the face does; unfortunately, it says almost nothing 
about how the face does it. Likewise, there is no shortage of talk about alterity as ethically central; but 
there is almost nothing on how alterity “becomes [ethical] proximity.” I offer a concrete way to answer 
this “how” question and close this explanatory gap, without recourse to traditional Levinasian 
catechisms. Taking cues from Kant’s 2nd Critique explanation of how the law elicits respect, I offer a 
two-part “normative mechanism,” the first part of which consists of Cavell and Levinas’ claims about 
the normative structure of suffering: that it strikes the sufferer as an unrelentingly individual imperative 
(“YOU handle/undergo this!”) — an imperative issued to/imposed upon the sufferer alone. The 
second “part” of the mechanism is Kant’s claim about the requirement for something to count as a 
justified imperative: namely, that it ought be, in some degree inter-subjective/impartial. This sets up a 
structural conflict which strikes deeper than the level of particular rules/reasons: the criterion for 
something to count as a legitimate reason is necessarily violated by the isolating — even individuating 
— perfectly partial imperative of suffering. This renders, from separation in suffering, a strangely tragic 
solidarity — a shared a priori sense of suffering as not merely as an event but an offense — and 
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Christopher Howard and Wendelin Küpers (Massey University, W.Kupers@massey.ac.nz) 
Travelling as Embodied and Inter-Placed “Be(com)ing” 
 
Based on approaches and insights from phenomenology and hermeneutics, this paper aims to 
contribute to a processual understanding of travelling as inter-relational event of be(com)ing. 
Specifically, adopting an advanced phenomenological perspective, following Merleau-Ponty (1962, 
1995, 2003), travelling is argued to be an embodied and situated nexus of inter-related active and 
passive as well as individual and collective dimensions situated in spaces and times of in-betweens. 
When travel practices are approached as relational processes, rather than stable entities, psychic and 
agentic processes of traveller and affected stakeholder are seen to exist and are in turn limited and 
shaped through their inter-dependencies to socio-cultural and system dimensions and vice versa. 
Despite being in liminal, anti-structural positions “out there,” traveller’s experiences and happenings do 
not unfold in isolation from broader narrative identities and their impact on shaping of reality. 
 
 
Mark Howard (Monash University, mahow1@student.monash.edu) 
Social Movements as Aesthetic Interventions 
 
Violence typified the Italian social movements of the 60s and 70s, ending in the brutality of the “years 
of lead.” This movement sector has particular significance in the sociological discipline of social 
movement theory (SMT), raising questions of how high risk activism was justified and defended by its 
agents. This paper considers the adequacy of the conceptual vocabulary of SMT, arguing its particular 
use of concepts from aesthetic theory to address lacunae in structuralist and identitarian models of 
radicalisation diminishes the account of social movements. Specifically, the instrumentalist 
understanding and use of aesthetic vocabulary in SMT obscures important dynamics of group 
emergence in radical politics. In response to this deficiency, I discuss work by Jacques Rancière that 
puts forward a way of understanding the formation of radical communities through the process of 
subjectivisation — the challenging of dominant frames and their classification and identification of 
subjects. Rancière questions the presupposition that social movements are the expression of a social 
group. Alternatively, social movements are a movement of subjects, of people trying to find or 
apprehend an identity as fighters through the very dismissal of their sociological identity. I will discuss 




Apple Igrek (Oklahoma State University, zefelius.igrek@okstate.edu) 
Deconstruction’s Myth of Resistance 
 
Mutually reinforcing tendencies within cultural theory and deconstruction point to an all-pervasive 
problem in post-modern society, a problem that is diagnosed with varying theoretical terminology: 
acceleration, totalization, discipline, hegemony, the simulacrum, emotional synchronization, 
instrumental rationality, and suchlike. The responses to this problem are diverse, but often appeal to 
something in common. From primary texts to secondary literature, from Derrida and Baudrillard to J. 
Hillis Miller and Leonard Lawlor, there is a critical attempt to rethink infinite singularity in hopes of 
combatting the politics and phenomenology of presence. In each case an appeal is made to something 
irreducible to finite parameters (whether subjective, linguistic, pragmatic, or otherwise). In bringing us 
closer to infinite otherness, this strategy paradoxically sets up a new dichotomy between the inside and 
the outside; it is argued that we ought to be hospitable to the future, to what is incalculable and foreign, 
and that in any case it is impossible, by definition, to exclude what is limitless. That is to say, we ought 
to affirm precisely that which cannot be denied or rejected. This influential logic only works insofar as 
we presume a distinction between those who turn away from excess phenomena, i.e., those who are 
blinded by globalized consumerism and social media, and others who have learned to deconstruct their 
own bio-political subject positions. In this paper, I will argue that we need to give up such distinctions 
and that doing so will highlight new discourses and new possibilities. 
 
 
Andrew Inkpin (University of Melbourne, ainkpin@unimelb.edu.au) 
How Can a Hammer Be “In-Itself’? 
 
In several passages in Being and Time Heidegger describes readiness-to-hand as the in-itselfness 
(Ansichsein) of environing entities. Thus a distinction usually attributed to natural entities is provocatively 
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reassigned to tools (such as hammers) and instrumental relations, despite a simultaneous recognition 
that the purposive nexus of significance, which the latter exploit, is shaped by human agents’ 
generation of ends. Beyond this, Heidegger’s claims that presentness-at-hand is “founded” in readiness-
to-hand and that access to nature is mediated by instrumental relations appear to suggest that nature 
depends ontologically on the existence of Dasein — as indeed does the very notion of “in-itselfness” (SZ 
212). Having first identified some of the issues raised by these claims, this paper attempts to make sense 
of Heidegger’s thought that in-itselfness attaches to the ready-to-hand. Guided by the discussion of the 
“reality problem” in §43, it is argued that a correct understanding of the scope and the aim of 
Heidegger’s foundational claim on behalf of readiness-to-hand allows this to be done while avoiding 
implausible anthropocentric constraints on an ontological conception of nature. Overall the aim will be 
to show how a hammer can be “in-itself” without forcing us to be unrealistic about trees. 
 
 
Anita Jaboor (Deakin University, ajabo@deakin.edu.au) 
Deleuze and Literature: The Representation of Rhizomatic Space 
 
This paper will examine the assemblage of spatial metaphors in literary texts through a Deleuzian 
perspective. In this paper, I will be exploring how the rhizome concept is manifested in Joseph 
Conrad’s Heart of Darkness (1899) and Cormac McCarthy’s Blood Meridian (1985). These texts are 
purveyors of philosophical complexity, which make possible paradigm shifts that expose the unstable 
nature of Western thought. The pseudo-geographical metaphors of smooth, striated and rhizomatic 
space, conceptualized by Deleuze and Guattari, will provide a theoretical framework for surveying the 
treatment of space in Conrad’s and McCarthy’s novels. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari 
develop the rhizome concept that, as a model for theory and culture, allows the production of 
perceptions and reterritorialisation in the creation of new theoretical maps. In challenging tap-root 
systems of thinking, Deleuze and Guattari propose that within a rhizome thought, culture and desire 
are in a constant state of becoming, which essentially implies that they are always able to grow, develop 
and multiply. Through the characters’ infernal journeys into the Congo and the Western frontier, the 
novels literally move away from civilization, thus enabling a deterritorialization of one territory to 
recreate another. In essence, the treatment of space within the texts can be read as a metaphor, which 




Mark Jackson (Auckland University of Technology; mark.jackson@aut.ac.nz) 
Security, Preservation, Enhancement 
 
In an interview, “The Return of Morality,” Michel Foucault candidly suggests the extraordinary 
influence of Nietzsche and Heidegger on his thinking. Moreover, it is precisely reading them together 
that was genuinely at stake for him: “Nietzsche and Heidegger: that was a philosophical shock!” It is 
curious, despite this most overt statement on a fundamental orientation to thinking that so few 
commentators on Foucault have engaged explicitly with this genealogy. Given Foucault’s (again) stated 
reluctance to cite Heidegger at all and reference Nietzsche seldom, we need to conceive of a 
genealogical exploration implicitly rather than through overt reference. This paper aims at 
approaching Foucault’s 1978-79 Collège de France lecture course, The Birth of Biopolitics, in relation to a 
close reading of Heidegger’s 1943 lecture, “The Word of Nietzsche: God is Dead.” In this lecture, 
Heidegger engages the question of life in Nietzsche’s discussion of will to power, as well as broaching a 
fundamental understanding of the essence of “subjectness” in secureness, in the sense of insuring 
oneself (Sicherheit, Versicherung). Our aim it to engage in a correlative reading of the Foucault text in terms 
of the emergence, for Foucault, of biopower, and the coincident emergence of “apparatuses of security.” 
 
 
Helen Johnson (Monash University, helen.johnson@monash.edu) 
Ungrounded Subjecthood, Covert Objecthood: On Form and Commodity [Apocalypse Today Panel] 
 
Since “The Dematerialization of the Art Object” was first printed in Art International in 1968, 
dematerialization has developed along some perhaps unexpected trajectories. The shift towards 
temporality that once offered art an escape route from economic materiality now offers an increase in 
circulation, in the service of the post-Fordist commodity market. This shift will be examined in 
reference to the recent push towards a post-anthropocentric conception of the art object, posited in 
opposition to art as a space for critique, and attendantly to aesthetic experience. Post-anthropocentrism 
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in art will be considered as a force in opposition to the formation of the sensus communis in its relation to 
aesthetic experience, as formulated by Immanuel Kant. Rereading John Chandler and Lucy Lippard’s 
“The Dematerialization of the Art Object” through the lens of semiocapitalism, this paper draws on 
Michael Sanchez’s Contemporary Art, Daily, Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude and Jacob Taubes’s 
Occidental Eschatology to discuss shifting conceptions of temporality in relation to contemporary art. 
 
 
Campbell Jones (University of Auckland, campbell.jones@auckland.ac.nz) 
The World of Finance 
 
Beyond the political alarm bells being rung by its rapaciousness, finance has become one of the key 
philosophical questions of our age. Finance is reworking our world in the name of another world, and 
the question must be – which world? This paper advances a formalization of the logic of the world of 
finance and possible exits from this world through recourse to Heidegger and Spivak’s accounts of 
worlding and Badiou’s account of the logics of worlds. The world of finance is a world of profound 
ontological presuppositions, and the task of any historical ontology of the present will require 
accounting for these presuppositions. In short, it can be said: (1) finance presents a logic of the number 
which is the logic of arbitrage, a logic of the perpetual inequality of bodies across space and time; (2) 
finance distributes a world of separated bodies, promising a bad infinity of possible worlds and forms of 
life; (3) finance radically empties the world of content, which as Marx identified results from the 
representation in finance of the capital relation in its “most superficial and fetishized form,” that is, as 
“money that produces more money” (Capital, vol. 3: 515). Failure to take this grave logic of the world of 
finance seriously runs the risk of the institution of a world from which there will be no exit and of which 
there will be no end. 
 
 
Elaine Kelly (University of Technology Sydney, Elaine.Kelly@uts.edu.au) 
Dwelling in the Future 
 
Engaging with the works of Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas and Timothy Morton, this paper will 
speculate on futuristic dynamics of dwelling and mobility by looking into the deep past. This paper 
pivots around the questions: How can an “ecological thought” accommodate the issue of migration and 
dwelling? How can continental philosophy engage with emerging issues associated with climate 
change? In an effort to elaborate these questions, this paper outlines some historical junctures of climate 
and human migration in order to think through the political and ethical issues of dwelling and mobility 
today. Migration studies have tended to remain strongly within the nation-state structure when 
analysing movement across and within borders. In this paper I draw on some preliminary research I 
have undertaken into various scientific perspectives on the climate-migration nexus. In 2009, scientists 
Carto et al. wrote a paper titled “Out of Africa and into an Ice Age” in which they hypothesised that 
migration out of Africa over 100,000 years ago may have been climate-driven. From here, I will 
unpack its findings and assumptions in an effort to think through the relationship between borders, 
migration and belonging. What sorts of political, ethical and cultural insights can we draw out of this? 
 
 
Marguerite La Caze (University of Queensland, m.lacaze@uq.edu.au) 
The Politics of Guilt and Shame 
 
This paper focuses on the ways that perceptions and experiences of shame and guilt are shaped by 
political conceptions of who belongs to the more shameful and guilty parties. While shame tends to be 
thought of as a more social response than guilt, I will argue that guilt is also, often, a social 
phenomenon reflecting the views and expectations of others. Guilt is ambiguous between the fact of 
having done something wrong, and guilt as a felt experience. I examine guilt and shame and the 
expectation and need to take it on when one is not directly implicated. This is the converse of the 
refusal to accept guilt when one is actually culpable; a danger with the concept of collective guilt Arendt 
points out (2003). I use the debate between Jaspers and Arendt over guilt and responsibility, as well as 
Sartre’s work on shame, to develop an account of the political aspects of perceived and felt guilt and 
shame in oppressed groups. I argue that while both experiences have a social element, and social 
relationships are essential to ethics, the view that oppressed groups should experience the guilt and 
shame expected of them by dominant groups should be challenged. I will begin by articulating the 
nature of guilt and shame; then discuss how some philosophers (e.g. Calhoun, 2004) have argued that 
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the oppressed should accept the expected burdens of guilt and shame; and then show how that view 
can be questioned while still accepting the social nature of the experience of guilt and shame. 
 
 
Michael Leininger-Ogawa (Australian National University, michaelhlo@hotmail.com) 
Naming Beings: Ian Hacking’s “Historical Ontology” 
 
There has been relatively little commentary upon the connection between the work of Ian Hacking and 
continental philosophy. Amongst the various possibilities available, such a connection can be most 
clearly established with the work of Michel Foucault. Not only has Hacking written several pieces of 
commentary on Foucault, more importantly, Hacking has utilised aspects of Foucault’s work within his 
own historical investigations. Indeed, Hacking describes his own approach with a term borrowed from 
Foucault, “historical ontology.” This term is placed beside the commensurate terms “dynamic 
nominalism” and “dialectical realism,” by Hacking, to outline his notion of the relationship of 
correspondence between what comes into being and our conception of it; a particular balance between 
nominalism and realism that allows scope for both. This paper will seek to determine the structure 
necessary for this mutual accommodation in Hacking’s “historical ontology.” Consideration of this 
correspondence will be undertaken with an eye towards both the tensions that arise when such a fit is 
attempted and the solutions for these made available within Hacking’s work itself. Furthermore, the 
nominalism present in Foucault’s “archaeological” works, in particular The Order of Things, and 
interpretations of his nominalism by those such as Etienne Balibar, Paul Veyne, Slavoj Žižek, and 
Gilles Deleuze will provide a backdrop for our assessment of Hacking’s “historical ontology.” 
 
 
Alex Ling (University of Western Sydney, a.ling@uws.edu.au) 
Between Saturation and Exhaustion: Lars von Trier and the Melancholy End of Cinema [Film Philosophy Panel] 
 
Lars von Trier’s recent film Melancholia (2011) has provoked no end of debate: simultaneously hailed as 
a “masterpiece” and “tiresome,” von Trier himself half-dismissed the work as “too polished” and “a 
woman’s film” at its premiere at Cannes (where he was infamously declared “persona non grata” after 
noting that he had come to “understand Hitler”). Drawing upon the contemporary philosophy of Alain 
Badiou, this paper argues that von Trier’s recent film — as well as his cinema more broadly — in fact 
offers a profound meditation on the current state of cinema as both “saturated” and “exhausted” 
(concepts which are central to — yet arguably underdeveloped in — Badiou’s philosophy). Taking as 
given cinema’s imminent demise (or “subjective finition”), von Trier’s work insistently asks the 
question: did cinema live up to its potential? The paper thus uses von Trier’s cinema to both exemplify 
and clarify aspects of Badiou’s philosophy (in particular, his twin concepts of “saturation” and 




Tracy Ann Llanera (Macquarie University, tracy.llanera@students.mq.edu.au) 
Morality by Words 
 
For Murdoch, Nussbaum, and Rorty, the moral pulses along the blurred margins of a person’s inner 
and outer life. When seeking answers to moral questions, an individual tarries between two realms: on 
the one hand, her responses bear significance within a private universe where beliefs and desires dwell; 
on the other, they also figure within her environment where others thrive and connect with her reality. 
Now it is interesting to explore why they also argue reading literature best exercises the moral 
engagement between personal ends and public good. On the private level, literature invokes and 
modulates deep features of human life: for Murdoch, the form of the good; Nussbaum, the contingency 
of life; for Rorty, the irony of vocabulary. In the public sphere, literature counts as a tool for moral 
expansion: Murdoch believes it cultivates “unselfing”; Nussbaum claims it helps form images of unique 
lives; Rorty argues it enables us to recognize suffering. Thus the more literature we consume, the better 
our chances of becoming fulfilled persons with a bountiful sense of empathy. However, we can cast 
doubt upon this claim. A person nurtured by beautiful words cannot be guaranteed to grow into a 
moral one. Perhaps the most literature can do is teach us to comprehend situations, and recognize the 
good when it shines. This paper articulates the relation between literature and private and public ends. 
It culminates by provoking the question of literature’s limits. 
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Martyn Lloyd (University of Queensland, m.lloyd@uq.edu.au) 
Ethical Self-Fashioning and the Problem of Libertine Sociability in Sade’s Histoire de Juliette 
 
Sade’s most sophisticated and mature work is his 1801 Histoire de Juliette, ou les Prospérités du vice. The text 
has two striking aspects. First, Juliette develops across the course of the novel, gradually growing from 
being a homeless, if precocious, orphan to being a master libertine. Her growth involves developments 
in both her own person — the novel is a story of her ethical self-fashioning, the training and care of her 
embodied sensibility — and in her management of her relationships with other libertines. In this aspect 
there is a striking contrast with the story of Juliette’s sister Justine who, notwithstanding the increasingly 
brutal adventures to which she is subjected in the story, remains as incomprehensibly naïve in the last 
pages of the novel as she is in the first. In terms of literary genres, the move between the 1799 La 
Nouvelle Justine, ou les Malheurs de la vertu and the Histoire de Juliette may be understood as a move from the 
picaresque novel to the roman d’apprentissage or bildungsromane. Second, the text presents Sade’s 
philosophical ideas at their most sophisticated and the development of Juliette as a character is 
intimately related to the novel’s philosophical project. It is this interaction that makes the text a 
philosophical novel in the proper sense; tracing the interaction between the novelistic and the 
philosophical aspects of the novel will be the goal of this paper. 
 
 
Matthew Lorenzon (Australian National University, matthew.lorenzon@gmail.com) 
The “Order and Ornament” of Antagonisme I by Xavier Darasse and Alain Badiou 
 
For almost fifty years the philosopher Alain Badiou has collaborated with musicians on operas and 
chamber works that reflect and contradict his parallel philosophical oeuvre. While Badiou has recently 
begun to speak about Wagner and his collaborations with the composers Georges Aperghis and 
François Nicolas, we know almost nothing about his work with the organist, improviser, and composer 
Xavier Darasse on Antagonisme I for violin, vibraphone, marimba, piano, and voice. Composed for the 
1965 concours de composition at the Conservatoire de Paris, the work stands in close historical and 
conceptual proximity to Badiou’s first published writings. Through the analysis of letters, sketches, 
manuscript and performance scores, this paper argues that the music of Antagonisme I is an answer to 
Badiou’s paradoxical conception of music, presented in the text to the piece as well as in the 1964 novel 
Almagestes, where “Order and Ornament can no longer be distinguished.” The paper then considers the 
work in relation to Badiou’s contrasting theorisation of music as “completely intelligible” in the 1965 
article “The Autonomy of the Aesthetic Process.” 
 
 
Christopher Lucibella (University of Memphis, cjlcblla@memphis.edu) 
Deviations from the Norm: The Danger of Classifying Intersex Conditions as Disorders 
 
The medical conditions that have been classified in recent times under the heading “intersex” (and, in 
previous decades, “hermaphroditism” and “pseudohermaphroditism”) are diverse in their respective 
etiology and effect on body morphology, but have in common the fact that they may cause atypical 
genital configurations in infants, such that a neonate may not be immediately identifiable as “male” or 
“female.” In this paper, I follow theorists that have criticized contemporary medical protocols, which 
call for the treatment of intersex conditions through early surgical correction. Specifically, I address a 
recent change in the clinical management of intersex conditions, which comes in the form of a 
proposed shift in nomenclature from “intersex” to “disorder of sex development (DSD).” In considering 
the debate over this diagnostic label, I look to work by Ellen Feder, who argues in favor of “DSD.” 
Against Feder, I contend that “DSD” should be rejected as an umbrella classification for conditions 
that result in atypical genital configurations. Drawing from the thought of French philosopher Georges 
Canguilhem, I investigate the relationship between pathology and normality, and conclude that 
labeling a condition as pathological comes with a mandate to correct it. In the context of intersex 
management, “DSD” labels a particular set of features as disordered, and therefore condones the 
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Craig Lundy (University of Wollongong, craiglundy@gmail.com) 
Why wasn’t Capitalism Born in China?: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Non-Events 
 
Why wasn’t capitalism born in China? Why did capitalism emerge in the West, rather than China of 
the third or even eighth century? Deleuze and Guattari consider this question on numerous occasions 
throughout their writings. The answer that they provide is, in a word, the State. Through its principle 
of capture and control, the State apparatus restricts the intensification, propagation and abstract 
conjugation of decoded flows, thus inhibiting the facilitation of a field of immanence upon which 
capitalism depends. This response, apart from some terminological intricacies, is rather straightforward. 
However, what is it that lies behind this relatively simple response? And more importantly, what is it 
that motivates the question and Deleuze and Guattari’s frequent return to it? If one glances at the 
various instances that the question of capitalism’s emergence is invoked, it will become clear that 
Deleuze and Guattari are not always so interested in the answer. Instead, the question is often raised in 
order to illustrate the significance of a particular kind of question — namely, the kind of question that 
calls into consideration the contingency of history and the history of contingency. After discussing 
Deleuze and Guattari’s answer to the question of capitalism’s non-emergence in China, the second part 
of this paper will thus explore the manner in which this question might suggest to us a Deleuzian 
philosophy of not events, but non-events. 
 
 
Ruaridh MacLeod (Columbia University, rjm2132@columbia.edu) 
Heidegger and Neuropsychology: The Structure of Mood Considered in the Light of Current Emotion Theory 
 
Following Matthew Ratcliffe’s work, I link Heidegger’s conception of mood with recent 
neuropsychological study into the nature/function of emotions, taking care to emphasize the derivative 
nature of reasoning and scientific study when considered in relation to the irreducible and disclosive 
operation of moods within Dasein’s primordial state-of-mind, particularly as it is realized in “care.” 
Though Ratcliffe does much to convince that current emotion theory is complementary to Heidegger’s 
conception of mood, his approach has several shortcomings, which I seek to address. (1) The 
insufficient detailing of the exact relation between Heidegger’s concept of mood, and the general 
concept of emotion Ratcliffe holds representative of current thinking on this feature of Dasein’s 
existential-ontological being. Accordingly, I provide a more comprehensive sense of the relation 
between Heidegger’s rather loose characterization of “mood” (Sections 29–31), and the specific mode 
of attunement termed “fear.” (2) Ratcliffe’s claim that emotion “punctuates” the coherence of a given 
mood, or else arises from the disruption of expectation, distorts the actual nature of emotion per se, and 
its success is overly reliant on use of “negative” emotion. I attempt a more comprehensive outline of the 
role emotions play in relation to intentionality; and provide a portrayal of emotion, which is 
demonstrably more adequate to structure of mood within Being and Time. 
 
 
Daniel Mcloughlin (University of Adelaide, daniel.mcloughlin@adelaide.edu.au) 
The Politics of Human Rights and the End of History 
 
This paper considers the relationship between human rights and radical politics in the present political 
conjuncture. I identify two streams of thinking about human rights amongst contemporary continental 
philosophers. The first, which includes figures such as Alain Badiou and Giorgio Agamben, critique the 
role that human rights play in justifying contemporary state violence and argue that they should be 
abandoned by radical politics. The second camp, which includes Jacques Rancière and Michel 
Foucault, acknowledge such critiques, while arguing that human rights still offer an important tool for 
political struggle. I analyse these positions in light of Samuel Moyn’s historical analysis of the 
emergence of the institutions and discourse of human rights. Moyn argues that human rights became 
the dominant language of political resistance in the wake of the collapse of Marxism and national 
liberation as theoretical and political projects. While human rights have indeed provided an important 
political tool at the “end of history,” Moyn’s analysis suggests that there may be some limits in their 
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Andrew Macklin (University of New South Wales, andrewm@fbe.unsw.edu.au) 
Animate Architecture 
 
In this era of ecological crisis how do we think about the “materiality” or “objecthood” of architecture? 
Is it lifeless, organized matter — shelter or a machine — designed and activated by humans to service 
human functions, even if it does so sustainably? Or is it “alive,” moulding our consciousness of the life-
world, beckoning the body to behaviours that seed ecological consciousness AND working 
cooperatively and symbiotically with nature to heal and sustain not just our world but hers? Jane 
Bennett’s recent idea of “vital materiality” allows this shift in consciousness, for me, to an animate 
architecture. Vital materialism recognizes that humans have used ideological stereotypes (matter, 
things) to objectify the non-human world in order to own, dominate, use and abuse. More importantly, 
we have forgotten how living beings and inorganic things are “vital” — alive and autonomous with 
their own being and history that is omnipresent in human culture, which they powerfully shape. 
Dovetailing vital materialism with ecology in the context of architecture, it is no longer seen as a 
compilation of “things” which we design and through which we control the world but as an “agent” — 
an omnipresent living entity which animates our consciousness of the life-world opening us to 
engagement, mutuality and interconnectedness with the earth. This talk will be rumination on the 




Oren Magid (Georgetown University, omm6@georgetown.edu) 
The Authentic Conception of Eigentlichkeit in Being and Time 
 
Being and Time’s epigraph reads as follows: “For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean 
when you use the expression being. We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now 
become perplexed” (1; Plato, Sophist 244a). The two versions published in English do, at least. Yet 
neither translation accounts for Heidegger’s use of “eigentlich,” which modifies “meint” in the phrase, 
“was ihr eigentlich meint, wenn ihr den Ausdruck seiend gebraucht.” Thus, one of Heidegger’s most important 
and influential technical terms goes unnoticed in the very first sentence of Being and Time. This is the 
only such omission I have found in either translation, and it goes against Macquarrie and Robinson’s 
explicitly stated strategy. Macquarrie and Robinson claim to identify an “informal” use and a “much 
stronger,” technical use of “eigentlich”: “In the contexts which seem relatively informal we shall write 
‘really’; in the more technical passages we shall write ‘authentically’ “ (5, fn. 3). The translators’ 
oversight is telling: it is hard to see how either use makes sense in this passage. In this paper, I will show 
that: (1) There are no such “informal” uses of “eigentlich” in Being and Time, and (2) the standard 
interpretation of the “technical” use of “eigentlich” — as an “existentialist” concept — is not sufficiently 
broad to show its relation to the central ontological question of Being and Time: the question of the 
meaning of being. 
 
 
Nick Malpas (University of Sydney, nick.malpas@gmail.com) 
Normativity, Politics, World 
 
This paper explores how normativity is connected to the inter-human world and particularly to politics. 
I begin by looking at Christine Korsgaard’s account of normativity, which I build upon and revise. 
Korsgaard claims that the source of normativity is the reflection of individuals, although she 
acknowledges that normativity is related to human sociality since reflection requires language and the 
reasons for our actions must be public. On this view, language and sociality are conditions for 
normativity only insofar as they are conditions for reflection. While reflection certainly is necessary for 
normativity, I draw on Hannah Arendt’s work to argue that it is the intersubjectivity of human 
existence, rather than reflection, that is the source of normativity. Normativity, as well as particular 
norms, should be understood as part of “the world” which lies between people. Normativity in general 
is grounded in our answerability to others, while the specific norms that bind an individual arise out of 
the interactions and relationships they have with others. As intersubjective and worldly, normativity 
must then be understood as dependent on politics, that is, activities of collective self-constitution and 
self-determination. One’s normative outlook is constituted by one’s particular political situation, and, 
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Monica Marchetto (University of Palermo, Italy; monica.marchetto@libero.it) 
Schelling’s Theory of Matter 
 
The problem of matter is one of the central issues in Schelling’s philosophical thought. In the years 
1797-1800 Schelling takes Kant as his point of departure not only for his transcendental philosophy, 
but also in the construction of matter. Already for Kant the concept of matter constituted a systematical 
problem, since it was neither an entirely empirical nor an a priori concept. Schelling takes up and 
develops the issue within the context of his own philosophy. In his attempt at speculative 
comprehension of matter, he turns his attention to the contemporary scientific debates (in particular to 
the theories of chemistry, electricity, biology), integrating their results into his own system. In 1801 
Schelling unites transcendental philosophy with the philosophy of nature, thus establishing a 
philosophy of absolute Identity, which leads to the transformation in the concept of matter. The present 
paper intends to investigate Schelling’s theory of matter from the following two points of view: (1) 
conceptual inquiry and (2) historical analysis of Schelling’s thought in the context of the natural science 
of his day. 
 
 
Reyvi Marinas (Monash University, reyvi.marinas@monash.edu.au)  
The Overseas Filipino as Conscious Pariah: Theorising Filipino Identity Through the Lens of Hannah Arendt 
 
The paper theorises the identity formation of overseas Filipinos through the lens of Hannah Arendt. In 
particular, I argue that Arendt’s notion of the “conscious pariah” provides a theoretical framework in 
the formation of a distinctive Filipino identity. I examine the development of her thought on the 
conscious pariah and how this framework fits within her understanding of politics. I then explore the 
historical formation of Filipino identity and demonstrate how Arendt’s framework is understood by 
drawing on early Filipino exiles, not only to draw parallels with Arendt’s “exemplary” pariah figures, 
but also to highlight the resuscitation of the pariah’s “hidden tradition” (to use Arendt’s words) as an 
ongoing “political project” of the Filipino struggle at home and abroad. 
 
 
Jodie McNeilly (University of Sydney, jodie.mcneilly@gmail.com) 
Bodily-Schemata and Sartre’s I and Me: Reflection and Awareness in Movement 
 
Philosophers have faced the problem of self or inner awareness since the self, itself, became something 
to be known and/or understood. Once dancers “let go of the mirror” (Claid 2006) they too began to 
face the problem and limits to bodily awareness, developing specific reflective practices to obtain access 
to their inner bodily selves. But for the phenomenologist, reflection requires an active process of 
perception, which problematises our grasping of the so-called hidden, organizing structures of 
movement that are unable to be perceived (bodily-schemata). For the dancer, then, how is it possible to 
access and have a deeper understanding of these nonconscious bodily structures? What are the limits to 
inner bodily awareness? In this paper, I draw upon Sartre’s challenge to Husserl’s pure ego with his 
notion of object transcendence in his essay of 1937 “Transcendence of The Ego: An Existentialist 
Theory of Consciousness.” I do this as a possible means for understanding bodily-schemata and its 
expression through interactive dance technologies. Using several examples from dance performances, I 
suggest how bodily-schemata can be accounted for if our attention is not directed towards an inner 
sensing of the body, but towards a site of interaction where objects or materials extend or “supraextend” 
our bodies in the form of clothing, costume and digital representations. 
 
 
Thomas Mical (University of South Australia, dr.mical@gmail.com) 
Cold Surfaces 
 
The images and senses of coldness and cruelty permeate the ambient spaces of our designed neo- 
modernity, operating in the world as a repetition compulsion tending towards reductivism by emptying. 
The increasingly hyper-minimal and super-flat surfaces of the word are the result of a para-ethic of 
efficiency driven by the technological imperatives and the movement towards surface-affects. These 
infrathin surfaces are nominally varied in their appearances, but increasingly unified in their 
symptomatic demonstrations, and are perfect analytical tools for understanding the process of surfacing 
(or “skinning”) the world within late modernity. This essay examines the concept, percept, and affect of 
these minimal surfaces as complex reconceptualizations/reterritorializations of the subjectivities and 
desires they are engineered to contain and control. The past heroic period of emergent 20th-century 
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architectural modernity labelled “The International Style,” with its apparent turn to ascetic white 
surfaces and planes (in art and architecture), will be re-examined as the source of this contemporary 
world of coldness and cruelty, of disciplining surface-affects. This recalled white wall and glass wall 
fashion was developed from a hydrostatic pressure model of spatial deviations — architecture designed 
as soap bubbles, and will be rethought in light of processes of condensation. This essay will attempt a 
Deleuzian schizoanalysis of the modern architectural skin (Venus in steel?) — in terms of the affective, 
hygienic, and political criteria used to justify their appearance by select designers. The abstracted 
surfaces persist and become more cold and cruel as an ethic of disciplined imagination, though the 
forces (desiring-machines) driving that formation are now nearly inverted from high modernity in the 
contemporary condition. In fact, a subtle set of conceptual and perceptual reversals have occurred at 
the surface between modern and pre-modern. In examining the design sense of the minimized surface 
today, we will examine the unintentional effects of these surfaces, especially for the minimalist surface’s 
frequent perception and affect of coldness and cruelty and the reorganization of sense it forecasts, 
following Deleuze’s work on Sacher-Masoch and implicitly following his writings of The Logic of Sense. In 
its entirety, this essay theorizes an intentional affective coldness and cruelty of the contemporary 
surfaces of sense (and non-sense). 
 
 
James Muldoon (Monash University, james.muldoon@monash.edu) 
Arendt and the Occupy Movement 
 
The Occupy Movement has been one of the most significant political phenomena of recent years. In 
this paper the theoretical perspective of Hannah Arendt will be deployed in order to conceptualise the 
Occupy Movement in terms of her notions of political freedom, constituent institutions and the public 
realm. From this standpoint, the Occupy Movement can be viewed as an attempted Arendtian 
revolution: a radical critique of representative democracy and an endeavour to institute a more 
participatory and direct form of democracy through citizens’ councils. The central principle of the 
Occupy Movement is an Arendtian understanding of freedom as self-governance in which citizens are 
actual participators in government. The basic structure of the Occupy Movement is that of de-
centralised, autonomous citizens’ assemblies. In On Revolution, Arendt argues that for a revolution to 
lead to genuine processes of democratisation it must preserve a space in which citizens can participate 
in government. For Arendt, both the French and American revolutions failed to incorporate a space for 
citizens to participate in government and thus failed to preserve the revolutionary spirit. The Occupy 
Movement can be considered revolutionary in Arendt’s sense of the term because it seeks to rejuvenate 
the idea of citizens deliberating over the common good in public assemblies. For Arendt, it is only 




Joshua Mullan (RMIT University, joshua.mullan@rmit.edu.au) 
Did Derrida Foreclose the Possibilities Offered by Community? Responding to Esposito’s Critique of Derrida 
 
While it is well known that Derrida was quite suspicious of the notion of community and tended to 
avoid using it, should this reticence be read as a rejection of it? In a recent interview, Roberto Esposito 
has claimed that Derrida forecloses the possibilities offered by this term. In this paper I respond to 
Esposito’s critique and demonstrate how a closer reading of Derrida’s later work highlights his 
longstanding engagement with the question of community. However consideration of their respective 
approaches also demonstrates that there is a need to clarify the significant differences between them. I 
highlight these by responding to two claims that Esposito levels against Derrida, namely that he rejects 
community for a weaker notion of friendship, and that his conception of community as self-
destructively auto-immunitary fails to consider the dialectical character of immunity. In responding to 
these claims I clarify some important aspects of the ways Derrida approaches rethinking community 




Maria O’Connor (AUT University, maria.oconnor@aut.ac.nz) 
Night Moves 
 
My aim is to journey slowly into darkness, into movements of night conditioned by ambitious thought 
via Gilles Deleuze and Maurice Blanchot on an ethics of the image. Both, in their singularities, bring to 
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the image thought as an active force that affirmatively (or ethically) frees the work from a fixed point of 
view. More radically they offer re-encounter of the work of art in terms of intensive flows of existence 
expanding perception. Rather than open new thought as a position of adding to an excess of new 
experiences for including more in our lives, their (night) moves aim to re-problematise models of fixity 
that secure moralism (and not an ethics). The conception of night in my title is attributed to Blanchot’s 
other night or désoeuvrement as unworkability, essential to the work of art in its refrain from certainty or 
finality. Night Moves as an extended title is attributed to Deleuze’s conceptual offerings (immanence; 
difference and repetition of time; impersonal affects and percepts; non-narrative formal intensities; 
imperceptibility) that ethically perform dynamic interlacings, affirming the mobility of thought. His 
night moves unhinge Blanchot’s madness of day — our frustrated attempts in pinning down existence 
once and for all. Night Moves concludes on Tom Ford’s A Single Man (2009) as a cinematic example of 
existence as ungraspable in its everyday recession, offering encounters for discovering, inventing, new 
possibilities of life. 
 
 
Michael Parmenter (University of Auckland/Université de Paris 1 Panthéon/Sorbonne, 
dancer@paradise.net.nz) 
Gestures of Incarnation: Two Contending Phenomenologies of Life 
 
With at least three recent English translations and as many new books devoted to his philosophy, the 
work of the late French phenomenological thinker Michel Henry is receiving belated recognition in the 
Anglo philosophical world. From the beginning Henry’s phenomenology of life found its fulcrum point 
in his radical critique of phenomenology itself and in his late works received further characterization by 
participating in what has been labeled the “theological turn.” Henry’s phenomenology of life, 
according to the title of one of his last books, presents itself as a philosophy of Incarnation. Henry’s 
phenomenology, however, stands in sharp contrast to a contending phenomenology of life, that of 
contemporary thinker Renaud Barbaras. Where Henry places himself in opposition to the world-
embracing philosophies of Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Barbaras, as one of the leading 
authorities on the work of Merleau-Ponty, and more recently the a-subjective phenomenology of Jan 
Patocka, characterizes the phenomenon of life in terms of the living beings participation in a world of 
otherness. I will briefly introduce Henry’s phenomenology of life, examine Barbaras’ critique of Henry 
and sketch Barbaras’ alternative phenomenology of life. I suggest that though there are no explicit 
theological references in Barbaras, his philosophy, more than that of Henry, lends itself to an 
incarnational vision of the world. 
 
 
Paul Patton (University of New South Wales, prp@unsw.edu.au) 
Power, Government and Strategy: Foucault’s Reconsideration of Power after 1976 
 
Foucault’s lectures in 1976 open with the statement of an intellectual crisis. They proceed to a series of 
questions about the nature of power and the ways that he has conceived of it up to this point: what is 
power? How is it exercised? Is it ultimately a relation of force? Only some of these questions are 
answered in the course of these lectures. His answer to the overriding question, ‘what is power?’ is not 
forthcoming until after the discovery of governmentality in his 1978 lectures. It is not fully developed 
until after his lectures on liberal and neoliberal governmentality in 1979. This talk aims to retrace his 
answers to the questions in the light of the published lectures and to examine the consequences of these 
answers for his analysis of neoliberal governmentality. 
 
 
Knox Peden (University of Queensland, k.peden@uq.edu.au) 
The “Strange Spinozism” of Gilles Deleuze 
 
Prior to Gilles Deleuze, most French thinkers considered Heidegger and Spinoza to be authors of 
incommensurable philosophies. When Deleuze began to develop his own metaphysics in the 1960s, 
however, he sought to move beyond the impasses of French phenomenology by working with concepts 
and themes that had their firmest roots in a particularly French rationalist reading of Spinoza. The 
result of Deleuze’s effort was a philosophical monstrosity — which was not a term of abuse in his 
vernacular — that married these two heterogeneous strands of twentieth-century French philosophy 
and shifted the sense of both inherited traditions. 
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Mairéad Phillips (University of Melbourne, maireadphillips@gmail.com) 
Between Relation and Impulse: Hitchcock’s Body Count 
 
In Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Deleuze says that Hitchcock will “borrow a particularly striking action 
of the type ‘killing’, ‘stealing’ from the detective or the spy film.” In the analysis that follows, Deleuze 
sees Hitchcock’s dead bodies as falling in line with his relational reading of Hitchcock’s films: “all is 
interpretation from beginning to end,” even murder, it seems. Deleuze borrows heavily from Rohmer 
and Chabrol’s concept of ‘exchange’, “which we find everywhere in his work.” One does not ‘commit’ 
a crime in a Hitchcock film; one ‘delivers’ it up ‘for’ another. But is something missing in this analysis, 
especially when we consider the sheer volume of dead bodies Hitchcock’s films produce? There is, 
however, another species of image that deals more explicitly with death, namely the impulse-image. 
The impulse-image is saturated with death, indeed, as Deleuze argues, death is its constitutive element: 
“it brings everything together in a single identical death impulse.” Hitchcock’s dead bodies then are 
fragments torn from the originary world, “the set which unites everything, not in an organization, but 
making all the parts converge.” Is there a contradiction then, between death as relation- and death as 
impulse-image? This paper shows how the image of the dead body in fact reveals in most striking 
fashion how relation and impulse are united in Hitchcock’s films, how his cinema is in fact a 
combination of the two images rather than exclusively one or the other. 
 
 
Francis Plagne (University of Melbourne, f.plagne@student.unimelb.edu.au) 
Blumenberg’s Philosophical Anthropology and the Gnosticism Debates 
 
Beginning with the publication of the first volume of Hans Jonas’ Gnosis and the Spirit of Late Antiquity in 
1934, the interpretation of the Gnostic religions of late antiquity became a matter of interest not only to 
historians and theologians, but also to philosophers. As Jacob Taubes noted, these debates can be read 
not only as contributions to the historical understanding of religious phenomena but also as “indicators 
of the present intellectual climate.” I argue that the relevance of Gnosticism for 20th century German 
intellectuals was primarily in terms of philosophical anthropology, specifically with regards to the 
anthropological possibility and significance of radical negation (sometimes understood in historically 
specific terms, bound up with the interpretation of modernity, as Taubes argues, but at other times 
understood trans-historically). Against this background I reconstruct the anthropological system of one 
of the most important voices in these debates, Hans Blumenberg. It is only against the background of 
multiple theorizations of the liberating power of what Adolf von Harnack called the “gloriously foreign” 
in Marcion’s Gnosticism (often formulated as a response to a perceived exhaustion of the project of 
modernity) that Blumenberg’s dismissal of the interrelated concepts of imagination, utopia and 
negation can become comprehensible, along with his unified critique of figures as seemingly diverse as 
Adorno, Karl Barth, Rudolf Bultmann and Heidegger.  
 
 
Pierre-Jean Renaudie (University Paris 4-Sorbonne, pjrenaudie@gmail.com) 
Why Can’t I Be Transparent to Myself ? The Paradox of Self-Consciousness in Derrida and Husserl 
 
It became quite common to criticize lucidity and self-transparency as an illusion generated by Descartes’ 
position of the ego. Such a critical analysis rejects the Cartesian claim of having direct access to my own 
ego, and considers that inner perception is a delusive metaphysical presupposition. Husserl’s 
phenomenology has often been associated with this erroneous conception of self-knowledge. In his 
interpretation of Husserl (in Voice and Phenomenon), Derrida argues against this conception of the 
immediacy of self-consciousness. He posits that reflection creates an irreducible distance, between me 
and my own states-of-mind, preventing me from being transparent to myself. In this paper I will show 
that these two opposing positions are not as contradictory as one might think, but rather that they share 
the same presuppositions about the relation between subjectivity and interiority. I argue against 
Derrida that Husserl’s theory of expression can be understood as an attempt to give an account of the 
self without needing to presuppose any kind of inner perception, and I show that, in fact, Husserl 
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Jack Reynolds (La Trobe University, jack.reynolds@latrobe.edu.au) 
Transcendental Pragmatics? Deleuze, Pragmatism and Metaphilosophy 
 
Extending work I have previously done on the significant metaphilosophical role that transcendental 
reasoning and common sense have played in differentiating much work done in so-called analytic and 
continental philosophy, in this paper I take up the challenge of pragmatism. Pragmatism is a tradition 
that predates any such “divide” and has a prima facie claim, even today, to being irreducible to any 
such “divide.” Indeed, in recent times Sami Pihlstrom’s Naturalising the Transcendental incorporates some 
forms of American pragmatist thought within the post-Kantian transcendental tradition, by relating the 
work of “postanalytic” philosophers like Wittgenstein, Putnam, McDowell, Rorty, Brandom, and others 
to this trajectory. This paper will consider the prospects for such a transcendental pragmatics, largely 
by considering the extent to which any such rapprochement is predicated on criticisms of what 
McDowell calls bald naturalism. It will also be suggested, drawing on Deleuze’s critique of good and 
common sense in Difference and Repetition, that a bracketing of the metaphilosophical value of common 
sense is also required. The conjunction of these two features — critique of bald naturalism and critique 
of common sense — are central to any transcendental philosophy worthy of the name. 
 
 
Louise Richardson-Self (University of Sydney, lric8416@uni.sydney.edu.au) 
Thinking Difference: Irigarayan Insights on the Problem of Same-Sex Marriage 
 
According to Luce Irigaray, difference is “still conceived of and lived hierarchically.” This statement 
holds much weight, particularly for same-sex couples who remain without the right to marry in many 
countries. But there is dissent among the queer community as to whether marriage equality is an 
appropriate goal. Some view the goal of marriage as contrary to the goal of attaining respect for queers 
regardless of their (real or perceived) differences to a heterosexual standard of normalcy. The problem, 
according to this perspective, is that seeking marriage equality sends the message that queers simply 
want to be “like” normal heterosexuals, as popularly imagined. But attaining rights due to ‘likeness’ is 
assimilative, and does not challenge hierarchical standards by which difference is conceived and 
perceived. However, Luce Irigaray’s politics of sexual difference may be useful for respectfully realising 
and recognising difference. I contend that Irigaray’s suggestion of rethinking difference in such a way as 
to promote “diversity-between” individuals, rather than “difference-from” individuals, could assist the 
formal legalisation of rights for same-sex couples for the right reasons. This will include the promotion 
of a conception of equivalent rights following from Drucilla Cornell, who has already begun to adapt 




Malcolm Riddoch (Edith Cowan University, m.riddoch@ecu.edu.au) 
Body Waves: Ecstatic Embodiment in the Art of the Earthquake 
 
As a phenomenological analysis of a sonic art performance, Body Waves explores emergent ec-static 
embodiment in this author’s performative experience of New Zealand sound artist Jo Burzynska’s (aka 
Stanier Black-Five) Christchurch earthquake soundscape. As an immersive sonic work of art, Body 
Waves has an immediate aesthetic impact on the auditory and somatic senses. Aesthesis, or the flux of 
straightforward sensory perceptions, is drawn into the on-going moment of the sounds themselves as 
they simultaneously rise and fall, subverting rational reflection and teleological expectations. Such is the 
ec-static temporalizing effect of indeterminate, experimental music performance. Beyond this 
immediate psycho-physiological immersion however, as a re-presentation of a dreadful natural disaster, 
Body Waves instigates a rupture between one’s world understanding and the earth that supports and 
nurtures it. Within this rupture, natura or phusis is uncovered in this sonic work of art as the emergent 
sway of being in constant becoming where ec-stasis is no longer merely a subjective experience of the 
bodying forth of ecstatic temporality but rather an ecstatic disclosure of the fragility of world. As a sonic 
work of art, Body Waves becomes a disclosure of one’s own world in a celebration of life as constant 
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Laura Roberts (University of Queensland, laurajaneroberts@gmail.com) 
Who Still Has Ears to Perceive Something of the Real? - Cultivating Difference in Luce Irigaray’s Between East and 
West 
 
Irigaray believes that the crises of our times stem from the fact that our Western culture is disconnected 
from nature, and consequently from the recognition of the fact that life is sexed. For Irigaray, when we 
“rediscover” this relationship between nature and culture, we begin to see human nature as two, as 
sexed. Culture becomes an extension of — and at the same time a return to — this dynamic sexed 
nature. She argues that if we acknowledge this relationship between nature and culture we will 
acknowledge that nature is made up of two sexuate subjects. And, importantly, each sexed subject must 
recognise its own relationship with nature (the sexed body) and with culture. The disasters that we face 
are the result of not properly understanding the nature/culture relationship in relation to ourselves, our 
being (two), in relations with others and with the planet. It is for this reason Irigaray suggests we may 
learn some lessons on how to reconnect with the body and re-establish the link between nature and 
culture from yoga. In Between East and West Irigaray writes about her own personal experiences of yoga 
and eastern philosophy as a woman situated within “western” culture/s. This work also opens up space 
for discussion on the relationship between sexual difference and other differences of culture, religion or 




Jon Roffe (University of Melbourne, jonathan.roffe@unimelb.edu.au) 
The Pricing Surface and the Body Without Organs: Contribution to the Philosophy of the Market 
 
This paper proposes to deal with one of three essential questions regarding the nature of the market, 
namely ‘What is the ground of market activity?’ I will draw upon two resources to answer this question: 
the analysis of capitalism prosecuted by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in Anti-Oedipus, and the 
ontography of the market found in the work of Elie Ayache’s Blank Swan. From the former, I will draw, 
on the one hand, on the theory of the distinction between wage and finance capital, and on the other, 
on the notion of the full body of organs of the capitalist social formation. From the latter, I will make 
use of the notion of the market as a pricing surface, on which are inscribed entirely value-free pricing 
chains. On the basis of these two bodies of work, I will advance a definition of the market as the a priori 
global surface of inscription that underpins contemporary social reality while withdrawing from any 
attempt to instrumentalise its function by any given regime of regulation. When supplemented with a 
theory of market dynamism and an account of the market’s realization-regulation, I contend that this 
analysis provides a sufficient philosophical answer to the ontological question of the market and 
consequently, due to the absolute position of the market in the contemporary situation, an essential 
element in the construction of an ontology of the present. 
 
 
Alison Ross (Monash University, Alison.Ross@monash.edu) 
The Meaning of the Prosaic: Jacques Rancière as a Reader of Walter Benjamin [Rancière Panel] 
 
Rancière treats Benjamin as a thinker working within the scenario set out in Hegel’s conception of the 
modern emancipation of meaning. The key historical thesis of Hegel’s conception of the prosaic 
condition of the material world is that encrypted meaning belongs to the past; the modern 
emancipation of meaning has redeemed it. Consequently, figurative language that remains in the face 
of this emancipation is “pure non-sense.” Benjamin follows Marx in disputing the consequences Hegel 
draws regarding meaning, especially the idea that residual encrypted meaning is nonsense, but 
substantially accepting the terms of Hegel’s approach in which the (unfinished) project of modernity 
would be some form of emancipation of encrypted meaning. The crucial question Rancière asks is what 
the thesis of the modern emancipation of meaning means for Benjamin. His answer can be schematized 
as follows: For Benjamin, the idea that there are encrypted meanings is crucial for maintaining the 
prospect of emancipation, however, he does not see these meanings as able to be decrypted. Benjamin 
subscribes to a conception of persistent encrypted meaning, which preserves the purity of the revolution. 
This paper will 1) critically examine Rancière’s assumption that Benjamin loads prosaic things, such as 
the arcade and the commodity, with encrypted meaning and 2) counterbalance his reading with a 
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Philipa Rothfield (La Trobe University, p.rothfield@latrobe.edu.au) 
Playing the Subject Card: Strategies of the Subjective 
 
Postmodern choreographer, Russell Dumas, is reluctant to leave his dancers to rehearse on their own. 
Why? Because they will only practise their ‘bad habits’. How could they do otherwise? If we are our 
habits, as Dumas often claims, then there is very little we can do to overcome them. Or is there? 
Alexander technique represents one such attempt to overcome habit. Predicated upon its own diagnosis 
of what is bad about habit, Alexander technique offers a strategic response, one which aims to inhibit 
habit so as to make way for something else: the possibility of moving otherwise. Alexander spoke of 
‘non-doing’ in relation to his technique. Although non-doing suggests an absence of subjective agency, 
the technique itself calls for a very particular kind of engagement on the part of the subject. 
 
The aim of this paper is to elucidate that which is implicit within Alexander technique; its 
acknowledgement of the force of subjectivity, but also its practical way of dealing with that force so as 
to enhance what a body can do. I will argue that there are a variety of ways to ‘play’ subjectivity in 
practices of this kind, that subjectivity is itself liable to strategic deployment. I enlist Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological account of the lived body as a means to investigate the so-called strategic 
deployment of subjectivity in these modes of practice. The common feature of these strategies is their 
element of undoing which I understand in terms of overcoming. Nietzsche’s Overman is the one who has 
broken the bonds of the human all-too-human. If Merleau-Ponty is able to discern the loosening of 
these bonds at the level of the lived body, it’s Nietzsche who continues the story with the concept of the 
Overman. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra loves the one who “wills his own downfall,” not for the sake of mere 
destruction (nihilism) but because the destruction of subjectivity makes space for something new. 
Deleuze coins a term, active destruction, according to which the human gives way to a new way of 
thinking, “other than the human type.” From the point of view of the subject, active destruction is the 
prospect of annihilation, but from the point of view of the body, of the dance of becoming, it’s not so 
bad. This paper will explore the sense in which subjectivity can be ‘played’ within these practices, 
towards what Deleuze calls the moment of transmutation, according to which the constraints of 
subjectivity give way to an affirmative manner of creation. 
 
 
Matheson Russell (University of Auckland, m.russell@auckland.ac.nz) 
The Pragmatics of Political Disagreement: On Rancière’s Critique of Habermas [Rancière Panel] 
 
Rancière presents Habermas as a figure emblematic of the new politics of “consensus” to which he is 
opposed. Superficially it is understandable why he should choose Habermas to be the foil for his 
positive project of creating conceptual space for the properly “political” activity of “dissensus.” But 
anyone familiar with Habermas’s work will not recognize him as an apologist for an oligarchic, 
managerial, technocratic, economistic “post-democratic politics.” Far from it. The position that 
Rancière describes as “consensus democracy” is one Habermas has been explicitly critical of for 
decades. What’s more, Habermas is far closer to Rancière’s position than this caricature would suggest. 
Not only is he a theorist of democratic politics but also, like Rancière, he grounds his model of 
democratic politics in the equality of humans as speaking beings. At what point exactly, then, does 
Rancière actually part ways with Habermas? And does his critique hit the mark, or could Habermas’s 
sophisticated theoretical framework accommodate Rancière’s worries? These are some of the questions 




Kriszta Sajber (University of Heidelberg, kriszta.sajber@gmail.com) 
Open Intersubjectivity: A Comparative Approach to Schizophrenia and Autism (TESIS) 
 
In recent theoretical advances in the philosophy of intersubjectivity, phenomenologists and cognitive 
scientists alike have drawn fondly on Husserl’s scarce remarks on “open intersubjectivity.” A crucial 
term, it has inspired novel interpretations of key texts of classical phenomenology and anchored fresh 
methodological approaches to the problems of empathy and understanding other minds. Yet some of 
the most potent theoretical implications of Husserl’s remarks remain underutilized while the term 
“open intersubjectivity” is examined separate from the overall context of the Husserlian project. In my 
paper, I purport to remedy this state of affairs, even as my treatment of the problems surrounding the 
concept also draws on evidence from the realm of psychopathology. Upon discussing the most 
important principles and motivations behind a Husserlian theory of intersubjective constitution, I will 
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turn to discussing two pathological variants in which the “openness” of intersubjectivity becomes 
subject to obstruction in two antithetical ways. One of these is characteristic of schizophrenic patients 
while the other is typically found in autism. I show that these two examples bring to the fore questions 
through which one may interrogate the tenets of Husserl’s philosophy of intersubjectivity in freshly 
productive, new ways. 
 
 
Max Schaefer (K.U. Leuven, m.schaefer1@nuigalway.ie) 
Forgetting and the Ascension of Thought 
 
Beyng, as that which gives, as Derrida notes, has an intrinsic relation with an “absolute forgetting” 
(Derrida, Given Time). In asking about this relation, this paper seeks to show that implied therein is a no 
less basic relation between thought and hope wherein both ascend beyond the capacities of their 
commonplace determinations. Heidegger first questions the limit of the giving-transcendence of beyng 
beyond the immanence of thinking in the form of assertion and its “lived experience” in consciousness, 
preparing the way for its more originary, in-apparent unfolding as the abyssal unity and undulation (i.e., 
event) of time-space (Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)). Where Heidegger lays out the 
plight intrinsic to this abyssal event of spatial-temporalization as an abandonment that takes place as a 
“remembering and expecting” that is “raised up and is directed out only toward the decision” 
(Heidegger, 303), and thus toward thinking as thanking and recompense, I maintain that this falls short 
of the transcendence (i.e., nothingness) of beyng as giving, and thus of a true encounter with the plight of 
this abyssal event.  More basic, and thus proper, to this most intimate and in-apparent nothingness of 
time-space, I argue, is an “absolute forgetting” beyond any manner of “recollection” (Derrida, Given 
Time), where thought’s place is, accordingly, anterior to all personal capacity, in first hoping from its 
affection by the ‘impossible’. 
 
 
Robin May Schott (Danish Institute for International Studies, rms@diis.dk) 
“Not Just Victims . . . But” 
 
Here I examine the concept of victim in two fields of debate, contemporary Anglo-American feminist 
discourses and contemporary security discourses. I argue that the dominant view of the victim as 
depoliticized, reified, and pathetic cannot be derived from phenomenological analyses of victims’ 
experiences or testimonies. Instead, these assumptions reflect the political agendas which frame debates 
about victims. In feminist discourse, a genealogical approach illustrates that the concept of victim is 
embedded in a contestation over whether feminist politics should be framed in terms of sexual 
difference or in terms of democratic collective political interventions. In security discourses, a 
genealogical approach indicates that the concept of victim is embedded in 1990’s interventionist 
paradigm. In the post-interventionist paradigm after 2000, the concept of victim has been replaced by 
the resilient subject who is empowered. Such an approach to empowerment overlooks the ways in 
which power operates through institutions and norms. The possibilities for articulating victim 
perspectives disappears with these contemporary modes of time (as future-oriented in an unending flow 
of uncertain possibilities), change (as inherent crisis) and self (as resilient and not marked by harm). In 
both feminist and security debates, the dismissal of the concept of victim reflects an ambivalence to 
concepts such as receptivity, passivity, and the capacity to suffer which earlier philosophers have 
considered to be central to human qualities. Decentring the victim vs. empowerment opposition opens 
up the significance of vulnerability as a fundamental human condition, without making normative 
claims as in recent ethical turns to vulnerability. 
 
 
Ricky Sebold (La Trobe University, rsebold@students.latrobe.edu.au) 
Realism and Nietzsche’s Perspectivism 
 
Any attempt to understand Nietzsche’s philosophy must come to terms with his well known, some 
might say infamous, doctrine of perspectivism. What can be so off-putting about it is the way in which 
it appears to undermine or at least put into question the notions of a mind-independently existing world 
that is the same for all observers and objective truth. What perspectivism seems to so conclusively rule 
out is something like a God’s Eye point of view or view from nowhere, which is often thought to be a 
necessary condition for making sense of metaphysical realism and objective knowledge. In this paper, I 
will first specify the ostensible inconsistency between perspectivism and metaphysical realism before 
going on to argue that the types of perspectivism that would genuinely posed a threat to metaphysical 
Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy Conference 2012 
! 33 
realism suffer from intrinsic philosophical difficulties and the ones more acceptable no longer form an 
impediment to realism. More specifically, what I call “strong truth perspectivism” faces three problems: 
(1) metaphysical, (2) self referential, and (3) trivial. I then go on to develop an alternative account of 
perspectivism, what I call “value perspectivism,” which is consistent with the commitments of 
metaphysical realism. Finally, I assess whether value perspectivism threatens the possibility of objective 
knowledge, ultimately determining that it does not. 
 
 
Josephine Seguna (Griffith University, J.Seguna@griffith.edu.au) 
Dasein’s Precarious Performativity in Law 
 
The social limits of disability; the vested interests and tenacious hold (Campbell, 2005:112) of ableism’s 
complex institutional, political structures and legal “mythologies,” are the source of the precarious state 
of the disabled identity. Indeed its “invisibility” is the consequence of separation from mainstream 
conventional facilities attributed to the physical and social barriers of “impairment” rather than the 
inadequacies and inequalities of sociality. This paper in consulting specific case law (Purvis v New 
South Wales Department of Education [1999] HREOCA 21 (3 August 1999) & Sutton v United 
Airlines Inc 527 US 471, 1999) will expose the fabricated “fixity” of disability in law and the reality of 
leaky identities by engaging in a theoretical discussion into the possibility of redefining justice. The 
philosophical investigation using the writings of Martin Heidegger and Judith Butler will allow for the 
actual removal of “the body” as the basis of legal determination. Embracing the conceptualization of 
Dasein as the process of seeking individual authenticity, the search for justice circumvents the need for 
ableist hierarchies of “acceptability” or scales of deserving and tragic otherness for “performativity” will 
re-characterize the nature of individual behaviour, autonomy and social interaction. 
 
 
Colin Shingleton (Swinburne University of Technology, cshingleton@optusnet.com.au) 
Understanding the A Priori: The Post-Metaphysical Implications of Systematising Analytic Philosophy 
 
In this talk I am going to address some of the issues raised by The Emmy Noether Research Group of 
analytic philosophers whose paper “Understanding the A Priori” seeks to re-think analytic philosophy. 
My goal is to show how this elucidation of analytic philosophy has post-metaphysical implications 
which allow speculations about the theory of understanding and the re-thinking of metaphysics and 
philosophy as autonomous fields of inquiry and point toward new approaches to explaining explanation 
which go well beyond centred radically objective metaphysical assumptions which configure analytic 
thought. The main conclusion of my speculative response to the Emmy Noether paper is that whatever 
explanation we accept of our investigatory authority, it is always configured by the metaphysical 
assumptions operating and that they are dependent on cultural, historical, semantic, intentional and 
metaphysical commitments like ontological and ontic preferences, and value, aesthetic choice and 
ethics. Without calculating the effect of these variables on argument, explanation has the characteristics 
of cultural and personal opinion based on an expression of the dogmatic understanding of how 




Simon Skempton (National Research University, Moscow; simonskempton@gmail.com) 
Badiou, Priest, and the Hegelian Infinite 
 
Hegel’s distinction between the bad and true infinites has provoked contrasting reactions in the works 
of Badiou and Graham Priest. Badiou claims that Hegel illegitimately attempts to impose a distinction 
that is only relevant to the qualitative realm onto the quantitative realm. He suggests that Cantor’s 
mathematical account of infinite multiplicities that are determinate and actual remains an endlessly 
proliferating bad infinite when placed within Hegel’s faulty schema. In contrast, Priest affirms the 
Hegelian true infinite, claiming that Cantor’s transfinite and his “diagonalization” mechanism of 
boundary transcendence are implicit in Hegel’s dialectic. Diagonalization can be seen as leading to 
either an endlessly proliferating bad infinite or the simultaneous transcendence and totalization of the 
infinity of self-relation, the true infinite. While arguing that a clear dividing line can be drawn here 
between two interpretations of the relationship between Hegel and Cantor, this paper also mounts a 
defense of the Hegelian true infinite, firstly by developing Priest’s suggestion that Cantorian 
diagonalizing functions are prefigured by Hegel’s dialectical overcoming of limits, and secondly by 
arguing that Badiou’s claim that the quantitative eludes the interiorizing tentacles of the dialectic 
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depends on a misreading of Hegel’s philosophy as a “metaphysics of presence” that Badiou shares with 
a number of his contemporaries and compatriots. 
 
 
Nicholas Smith (Macquarie University, nicholas.smith@mq.edu.au) 
What is Productive Action? 
 
The idea that productive action is a distinct action type, different in kind from moral action, is deeply 
ingrained in much Continental Philosophy. It is embraced by Arendt, Gadamer, and Habermas, 
amongst others, who owe their understanding of this idea to Aristotle’s famous distinction between 
poiesis (production) and praxis (action). For some time now, philosophers have been aware of the 
instability of Aristotle’s distinction, and the weaknesses of the social and political theories that are 
underpinned by it. But while the Aristotelian notion of praxis, and the associated concept of phronesis 
(practical wisdom), understood independently of the concept of poiesis, continues to attract the attention 
of philosophers, the concept of productive action itself has all but fallen from the philosophical radar. 
The question I raise in this paper is: what remains of the concept of productive action once it is 
abstracted from the discredited distinction between poiesis and praxis? If, for reasons that have been 
convincingly presented by Gyorgy Markus, James B. Murphy and others, productive action should not 
be contrasted with moral action in the way Aristotle and his Continental progenitors have supposed, 
how should it be conceived? 
 
 
Rhonda Siu (University of New South Wales, rhonda.siu@gmail.com) 
Music’s Life-Affirming Power in Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy 
 
This paper reconsiders the role that music is assumed to play in Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy (BT). It 
offers an alternative reading of this text through an examination of the nexus of his early linguistic, 
aesthetic and metaphysical views in BT, in conjunction with two, rarely mentioned unpublished essays, 
“The Dionysian Worldview” (1870) and “On Music and Words” (1871). My alternative reading 
coheres with the usual interpretation of BT insofar as it recognises that Dionysian music needs to 
coexist with the Apollonian plastic arts in order for the overall effect of tragedy to remain life affirming. 
Yet it also differs from this usual interpretation by questioning the idea that these two key aesthetic 
elements contribute equally to producing tragedy’s life-affirming power. It claims instead that this usual 
interpretation underestimates Dionysian music’s creative, transformative force to generate tragedy’s 
life-affirming potential through its potent expression of the metaphysical, corporeal, affective and 
intersubjective dimensions of human existence. As an expression of both pleasure and pain, of both 
creation and destruction, the musical element of tragedy provides a nuanced response to the 
ineradicable human suffering that Silenus’s wisdom expresses. In this context, then, the Apollonian 




Sean Sturm and Stephen Turner (University of Auckland;  
s.sturm@auckland.ac.nz, sf.turner@auckland.ac.nz) 
A Seismotics of the University 
 
Here we consider the design-drive of the university 2.0. In line with Deleuze and Guattari’s “pedagogy 
of the concept” (1997: 12), we investigate the construction of the university itself as a — perhaps the — 
preeminent site of knowledge transmission of late capitalist technoculture. By pedagogy, Deleuze means 
the “construction” of concepts, rather than the teaching of them (see Toscano 2004: 120–21); a 
construction of the concept of the university, we contend, must also include its architectonics, that is to 
say, how it grounds itself by building. Such a construction Deleuze calls “groundwork,” or “working on 
the ground” (Deleuze 1992: 159). We view the architectonics of the university through the lens of 
Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza’s optics, wherein “common notions (concepts)” are revealed by a “light 
that traverses bodies and makes them transparent,” such that they “refer to geometrical structures or 
figures that . . . are transformable and deformable in a projective space” (1997: 148).  
 
If our university is defined in its strategic plans and communications from the point of view of the 
visible, concretized in its building plans and those of Auckland’s “learning quarter,” our constructive 
method traces the visible and invisible lines of “force” and “flight” in the university (Deleuze 1992: 160–
61). From the point of view of the invisible university, “critical thinking” and “creativity,” to take just 
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two of the bedrock givens of our university, need reworking: here, they are entrepreneurial, rather than 
emergent properties of “knowledge work.” What is required is a seismotic rupture of the apparatus of 
the university 2.0 to divulge such lines of flight as lie athwart its “force-field.” The designed space of the 
university must be seen as something teachers and learners construct, or “diagram” (Deleuze 1988: 34), 
in practice, rather than something they simply experience as a pre-constructed environment. 
Classrooms, corridors, cafés, etc. are places where critical and creative thinking and talk — “upbuilding 
discourses,” to use Kierkegaard’s term (2009) — can, in fact, do take place. When such places work, 
they show that the university can be otherwise; they are places of “becoming-other,” of transformation 
and deformation (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 112). 
 
 
Michelle Styles-Dargie (University of Queensland, mstylesdargie@gmail.com) 
Mimesis, Embodiment and Writing 
 
This paper argues that writing is an embodied mimetic practice and expands on Elizabeth Grosz’s 
notion of calligraphic writing. 
 
 
Kiri Sullivan (University of Melbourne, k.sullivan3@student.unimelb.edu.au) 
The Cruelty of Time in Hitchcock’s Vertigo  
 
In Cinema 2: The Time-Image Deleuze describes Vertigo as one of “perhaps three films which show how we 
inhabit time, how we move in it, in this form which carries us away, picks us up and enlarges us” (1989, 
82). Deleuze borrows from Bergson and Proust when he observes that “time is not internal to us, 
but…we are internal to time, which divides itself in two, which loses itself and discovers itself in itself, 
which makes the present past and the past be preserved” (80). This paper explores temporality in Vertigo 
through analysis of instances of repetition and its embodiment in the Hitchcockian motif of the double. 
I suggest that it is the multiplicity of time and repetitions that produce, divide, and double bodies that 
serve to exemplify characters’ perspectives on and experiences of time. We can discern a specific 
relationship between time-images and the double by focusing on the Deleuzian notion of repetition 
containing difference. Deleuze’s theorization of the three syntheses of time in Difference and Repetition 
encourages a commitment to time as composed of multiple productive processes that create beings and 
bodies. Through the figure of the double, Vertigo shatters boundaries between past/present/future, 
reminding us that it is never the same — but only difference — that returns eternally through the 
enactment of violence and cruelty on the body of the double, and on those who try to repeat the past. 
 
 
Terrilyn Sweep (University of Queensland, t.sweep@uq.edu.au) 
Agent-Regret, Risk, Control Points and the Expression of Being 
 
In this paper, I explore Bernard Williams’ analysis of agent-regret, but flavour it with Heidegger’s 
ontological treatment of Being. It seems to me that there is an urge to take risks in order to experience 
something new and different. It is this urge that interests me, particularly when the action is a high risk 
one. Williams’ account of moral luck claims that how we think of ourselves in relation to actions we 
take is affected by intrinsic and extrinsic luck. When things go badly (and even if things go well) what 
we do or omit doing can result in agent regret. I want to propose that the need to create (new 
experiences), but seen from a Heideggerian viewpoint of the revealing of Being rather than subjective 
volition, should also be considered as a factor of intrinsic luck. It is a fact of our individual beings that 
we respond to the possibilities of creation and this sits in tension with the overt ontic results of one’s 
actions. In addition, I want to propose that there are control points in the revealing of Being. On the 
“safe” side of the revelation we are in control of what is revealed, but this is never a “free” expression of 
Being since Being will be expressed along pre-set parameters of our being-in-the-world. When we risk 
everything and allow Being to emerge, this is when agent-regret can arise. In some pursuits the free 
expression of Being is sanctioned and “safe,” such as in producing great art. The artist brings forth new 
expressions and does not (necessarily) suffer any consequences. This is one way of rendering new Being, 
however, if we play with new ways of being within ourselves, then there is a higher risk of losing control 
of the expression of Being. On the one hand this becomes authentic creation, on the other there is the 
risk of losing who we were. As beings-in-the-world we must survive within a pre-existing network with 
other beings. Rescripting our own being affects that of others. The need to discover Being within 
ourselves and the need to be-in-the-world are precarious companions. 
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Kim Tae-Kyung (University of York, tk612@york.ac.uk) 
Does Colour Physicalism Prove the Ontological Property of Colours? 
 
Objects have colours. We are able to perceive the colours and distinguish the difference between 
certain colours of the objects. Colour itself is a property of an object and has the phenomenological 
character that they appear to perceivers as they are. In explaining such characters of colours, some 
neuro-physiological analysis of visual organs and scientific analysis of light seem to give persuasive 
explanations, which support the colour physicalism. According to the physicalism, it is a physical 
property of colour, the surface spectral reflectance (SSR), which concretely defines the colour of objects. 
This physicalism has a strong idea as it can explain the colour constancy phenomenon and the 
mechanism of visual perception. This account might prompt two claims: firstly, colours are mind-
independent properties of material objects; secondly, that our content of perceptual experience is 
dependent on the physical property of colours and our visual organs. If these claims were right, then it 
could support the non-conceptualists’ claim that the contents of colour experience are sometimes non-
conceptual. However, there are some phenomena that the physicalists have to consider, for example, 
the idea that perceivers have different content of experience of colours even though they are under the 
same given conditions. This is called “colour variation.” In addition, we can perceive constant colours 
and apparent colours of hologram pictures without SSR. This implies that the perception of colours is 
not only dependent on the physical properties of objects. If this is right, then the physicalists may have 
to reconsider their belief that “colours = SSR.” Through the above issues, I will claim two things. First, 
that the contents of colour experience are not the responses of visual neurons to the stimulus; rather, 
they are applying concepts to the stimuli and the object. Second, that it has to be explained on a 
categorical level, not the physical level. 
 
 
Adam Tate (Macquarie University, r.tate.adam@gmail.com) 
The Incompleteness of Being and Time and the Incompleteness of Being and Time’s Concept of World 
 
Near the beginning of Being and Time Heidegger presents an analysis of the concept of world that has 
remained the key measure for virtually all commentary on Heidegger’s late 20s understanding of world. 
Accordingly, commentary on the problem of world in Heidegger tends to understand world in an 
intrinsic connection with practical comportments or the “network” of the work-world’s significance 
(Bedeutsamkeit) and so on. And yet, in Being and Time, Heidegger tells us that the unpublished third 
division would provide “a positive understanding of the problematic of the world . . . for the first time” 
(SZ 100). That is, the analysis of the surrounding world is so far from providing an answer to the 
problem of world, that it doesn’t even fully formulate the question of world. This paper will discuss 
Heidegger’s abortive plans for the fundamental ontological problem of world. Through this it will be 
possible to show that the problem of world in Being and Time intrinsically points to what Heidegger calls 
the problem of “transcendence.” It will be possible to show how this concept of “transcendence” has 
nothing to do with overcoming barriers; with linking together a collection of world-bits; with pragmatic 
systems or anything of this kind. Instead, it will be possible to show that and how this concept of 
transcendence is concerned solely and intrinsically with the worldliness of the world. 
 
 
Trevor Thwaites (University of Auckland, t.thwaites@auckland.ac.nz) 
A Leap into the Abyss: Heidegger on Thinking 
 
Heidegger delivered three lecture courses in Freiburg during the 1950s: What is Called Thinking? (1951-
52), The Principle of Reason (1955-56), and Basic Principles of Thinking (1957). In these lectures Heidegger 
follows his earlier trajectory of relating back to Greek thinking and, in this case, to the Greek 
conception of the opening or clearing. Heidegger also questions the notion of dialectical thought 
embedded in German Idealism suggesting that this clouds the essence of thinking. He promotes 
meditative thinking, thinking that begins with an awareness of the field and is open to its content and 
open to what is given (1951-52). Heidegger also claims that, in contemporary thought, logic has 
become more logical and has been modified into “logistics” so that “logic procures its ultimate and 
planetary form of dominance” empowered as “the soliloquy of language” (1957). He proposes a “leap 
into the abyss” which might be understood in Heidegger’s primordial ruminations as “saying” — 
whose basic characteristic is the letting appear or bringing forth. Heidegger stresses that “saying” is not 
limited to words and is the interconnection of being, language, and thinking. My discussion considers 
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Daniel Tigard (Tulane University, dtigard@tulane.edu) 
Culture and Punishment: A Nietzschean Analysis of Justice 
 
Naïve genealogists of morals have misunderstood the purpose of punishment. Supposing merely 
reactive and weak characterizations to be the origin of punishment is to overlook a greater, more 
powerful role possessed by the act itself and by the individual who carries it out. It requires an “active, 
aggressive, arrogant man,” a man whom, as Nietzsche claims, is “a hundred steps closer to justice than 
the reactive man.” What is it about the activity of the punisher that allows him to be seen in such a 
positive light? How exactly does punishment contribute to justice?  With his diagnosis of sick cultures, 
Nietzsche prescribes the closing of one’s horizons. Closed horizons work to the advantage of individuals 
that are able and willing to overcome the passivity and institutionalization of fear that plagues the last 
man. The society of the last man — as encountered by Zarathustra — is wrought with inactivity. 
Institutions are erected, poisons concocted, customs and laws established all with the negative purpose 
of avoiding pain and discomfort. In order for a culture to survive, its members must take positive action 
and, in doing so, take risks. “All acting requires forgetting,” Nietzsche explains. In this essay, I show 
how the ability to forget enables action, how administration of punishment is an active participation in 
justice. Such participatory justice, I argue, is virtuous in supporting a confirmation of meaningful 
existence and a positive organization of culture. 
 
 
Claire Timperley (University of Virginia, timperley@virginia.edu) 
Constellations of Indigeneity: The Promise of Adorno’s Negative Dialectics 
 
Despite international recognition of the importance of indigenous rights, indigenous communities 
continue to face obstacles to acknowledgement of and restitution for their grievances. Among these 
obstacles is a concern about the nature of indigeneity itself: what makes a person or a group 
indigenous? And why might indigeneity uniquely confer particular rights? While there has been 
sustained scholarly attention to the rights that should be granted to indigenous groups, the concept of 
indigeneity is rarely explored. However, without an understanding of what indigeneity entails, the 
grounds for restitution are shaky. In Negative Dialectics, Adorno calls for recognition of the nonidentical 
— those characteristics that cannot be subsumed under the universal. For him, the nonidentical is 
negative — it points to the place where understanding encounters limits. Adorno’s nonidentical offers 
fruitful territory from which to approach the power and limits of conceptions of indigeneity. It allows us 
to engage critically with a constellation of concepts that — through negative space — attends to the 
unique experience and history of indigeneity. Focusing on the negative allows us to re-imagine the 
possibilities of indigeneity by avoiding assertions that seek to bolster claims of one group over another. 
Instead, commitment to the nonidentical opens the possibility for nuanced assessments about the 
nature of indigeneity and the opportunity to question essentialised identities and knowledge. 
 
 
Søren Tinning (University of Turin, Italy; sorentinning2@gmail.com) 
The Active-Passive Architecture of the Critique of Pure Reason  
 
This article will outline two logics of activity-passivity in relation to the auto-limitation of reason in 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. One will articulate the possibility of transcendental knowledge through a 
linear dynamic where activity-passivity is sharply distinct by the concept of limit (Schranke). The other 
will articulate a circular logic demarcated by the concept of boundary (Grenze), which constitutes the 
structure of pure reason itself. It is in this fully independent circular structure that pure reason secures 
itself as a necessary foundation of transcendental knowledge. The outline will show how the limit is 
primary as the constitutive demarcation of the possibility of necessary knowledge but also entails an 
inherent infinite regress. This problem is solved through the boundary’s concession of a (negative) 
transcendence of the closed character of the limit, allowing reason to positively demarcating its own 
founding limitation; i.e. making its own pure auto-limitation possible.  Concluding, it will be discussed 
how the architecture of the CPR at central points appears ambivalent because the boundary challenges 
the constitutive priority of the limit; i.e. the openness of the boundary jeopardizes the closedness of the 
limit and thus potentially the necessity of transcendental knowledge. This final interpretation of the 
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CPR will lead to some remarks on how this ambivalence has been answered by Kant himself, by Fichte, 
and by Heidegger. 
 
 
Tyler Tritten  (Armstrong Atlantic State University, tyler.tritten@armstrong.edu) 
Necessity from Contingency: Otherwise than the Ens Necessarium and the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
 
In this presentation I propose that God is contingent. By this I am not espousing a form of process 
theology, whereby God’s consequent nature would be contingent upon the given datum of the world 
such that God is mutable and, more extremely, may even need to undergo an accouchement process in 
order first to come into being at all, nor am I proposing a process theology in which God would emerge 
as a novel quality, a supervenience upon a more original substratum. The god(s) of process philosophy, 
despite their mutability, always emerge according to a necessary manner of becoming. My assertion 
that God is fundamentally contingent — while not excluding that a subsequent necessity follows from 
God’s contingency — does not shy away from the fact that God is precisely that, a fact, and therefore 
something that could have not been, i.e. something contingent. My position stems from readings of 
Quentin Meillassoux, with his notion of supercontingency or Hyper-Chaos, and F.W.J. Schelling, with 
his notion of facticity of the unprethinkable. I will show how necessity is itself nothing but an accident of 
contingency. God’s existence is not grounded upon any sort of sufficient reason whatsoever, yet without 
precluded that his essence, i.e. his manner of being, is necessary. Necessity itself is a contingent fact. 
 
 
Chiu Yui Plato Tse (Chinese University of Hong Kong, tsechiuyui@hotmail.com) 
Reinhold’s Principle of Consciousness Revisited 
 
An understanding of Reinhold is indispensable if one is to understand the motivation and the context of 
development of post-Kantian idealism. Reinhold’s principle of consciousness is proposed as the 
universally valid and universally accepted first principle of philosophy and it was supposed to be 
capturing the fundamental structure of all instances of cognitive consciousness, including self-
consciousness. The theory is basically a representational theory of cognition. The purpose of this essay 
is to critically assess Reinhold’s principle of consciousness. The task is two-fold. Firstly, I will try to do 
some more justice to Reinhold in pointing out what is actually right about the principle, clearing out 
one false charge — which can be called the “regress-argument.” This argument against the principle 
takes issue with the structure of consciousness proposed by the principle and aims at rejecting the 
principle by appealing to self-consciousness as an instance that cannot be accommodated by the 
proposed structure of consciousness. I will suggest that this argument cannot effectively invalidate the 
principle, as there is at least one way to rescue it by further specifying the structure. Secondly, I will also 
point out what is really wrong with the principle, putting one real charge to the foreground. The real 
issue concerns the reality of the circularity inherent in the structure of consciousness, which is required 
by Reinhold’s affirmation of the principle as universally valid. 
 
 
Philippa Tunney (University of Tasmania, philippatunney@gmail.com) 
Husserl’s Failed Annihilation of the World 
 
In this paper, I offer an interpretation of the famous thought experiment in §49 of Ideas I where Husserl 
annihilates the world to leave only pure and absolute consciousness. I will argue, in contrast to the 
literature, that Husserl fails in his attempt to annihilate the world. My analysis of §49 rests on asking 
which of his own four definitions of world Husserl is trying to annihilate. In §1-48 Husserl has defined 
the world as first: the overarching-collective horizon, second: the horizon for specific types of objects, 
third: as the surrounding world, and fourth: as the physical/natural world. By looking at each 
understanding of world in relation to the thought experiment, I conclude that Husserl fails to annihilate 
three, but does successfully annihilate the physical world. I further argue that if Husserl is unable to 
destroy the first three understandings of world without also destroying consciousness, then there is an 
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Fiona Utley and Jane Lymer (University of New England and University of Wollongong; 
futley2@une.edu.au, jmb42@uow.edu.au) 
The Maternal as Hospitality 
 
There is significant play between the trope of hospitality as providing a political ontology and 
arguments that the maternal as pregnant embodiment is the original hospitality and thus the grounds of 
ethical engagement. For example, Diprose’s critique of a political ontology of hospitality identifies that 
political hospitality is only possible due to women giving their lived time as potential mothers towards 
establishing and maintaining domestic stability. The more conditional the hospitality the more existing 
inequities are exploited with women increasingly unlikely to garner recognition for their civil rights over 
embodiment and reproduction. Alternately Aristarkova argues that the Levinasian-Derridean 
conception of hospitality would benefit from acknowledging that the dematerialised idea of femininity 
as familiarity is a description of the maternal relation and it is the maternal body that grounds acts of 
hospitality. Such acknowledgement would open the possibility for welcoming the maternal into the 
discourse and provide a solution to Derrida’s aporia of ownership. The structure of images, here 
primarily the trope of the maternal to guide the development of a concept of the ethical and political 
subject, must be examined more thoroughly. In this paper we undertake a parallel reading of the 
maternal and the concept of hospitality by drawing upon La Caze’s work on specific forms of images 
used in philosophical thinking and Kristeva and Diprose’s work on women’s temporality. 
 
 
Dimitris Vardoulakis (Univeristy of Western Sydney, d.vardoulakis@uws.edu.au) 
Sovereignty and Foucault’s Biopolitics  
 
I argue that Foucault conceives biopolitics not as separate, but only as distinct from other forms of 
sovereign power. I highlight some aspects of the way that different “regimes of power” can be 
connected if sovereignty is taken to signify different forms of justification of violence. I also draw some 
implications for a more general theory of sovereignty. 
 
 
Daniela Voss (Free University of Berlin, Germany; vossdani@gmail.com) 
Pity the Meat! Deleuze and Francis Bacon 
 
According to Deleuze, both philosophy and works of art have the important task of resistance to what is 
intolerable in the present. To resist means to liberate us from the rule of actual facts and to create a 
movement of becoming beyond the actual toward the virtual, that is, the realm of virtual Ideas or pure 
events. For Deleuze, this movement of becoming — or process of “counter-actualisation” as he also 
calls it — has a clear utopian aim, namely that of calling forth a new earth, a new people. Francis 
Bacon’s paintings with their monstrous figures suffering from contortions and convulsive pain precisely 
pursue this utopian aim: the advent of a universal people in which the specific differences between man 
and animal are wiped out. The common zone between man and animal is the universal meat, which 
Francis Bacon captures in splendid colours. Deleuze detects in Bacon’s paintings an intense pity for the 
meat and a declaration of faith in life. What Bacon renders visible, we will argue, is the virtual Idea of 
vitality. This paper will connect Deleuze’s ethics of virtual becoming with the pictorial art of Francis 
Bacon and elaborate the metaphysical notion of universal meat (viande) as a challenge to the 
phenomenological notion of flesh (chair). 
 
 
Saige Walton (University of South Australia, saige.walton@unisa.edu.au) 
The Beauty of the Act: The Cinematic Gestures of Holy Motors [Film Philosophy Panel] 
 
In his only essay devoted to the cinema, “The Film and the New Psychology,” Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
was to approach film as a perceptual, aesthetic and gestural gestalt that recalls our own being-in-the-
world. Attending to a film’s temporal structure, as well as to its rhythm, movement, and sound, 
Merleau-Ponty argues that cinema incarnates ways of being — ways of being that are inter-subjectively 
apprehended through the perceptions and expressions of the lived-body. Shifting away from an 
internalized and hermetic account of the emotions, the philosopher maintains that “[a]nger, shame, 
hate, and love are not psychic facts hidden at the bottom of another’s consciousness: they are types of 
behaviour or styles of conduct which are visible from the outset. They exist on this face or in those 
gestures” (52). As with the communication of feeling to others through bodily gesture and attitude, 
Merleau-Ponty goes so far as to insist that what is “inside is also outside” at the cinema, whereby an 
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“interior landscape” is made manifest upon the surface of both body and film through particular styles 
of behaviour (58-59). While Merleau-Ponty productively captures the elicitation of feeling through a 
film’s surface expressions, the power of the cinematic gesture is delimited to the pre-reflective. To quote 
Merleau-Ponty: it is “perception [that] permits us to understand the meaning of the cinema” because a 
“movie is not thought; it is perceived” (58). What, then, are we to make of those films that deliberately 
and reflectively gesture towards their own cinematic being? How might our embodied intelligence be 
solicited by such self-reflexive gestures? This paper mobilizes Leo Carax’s recent Holy Motors (2012) — a 
film that gestures towards film history and Carax’s own work, while also attempting to figure the 
condition and possibility of the medium itself — to erode distinctions between cinema’s sensuous 
presentations and its reflective representations at the level of the lived-body. 
 
 
Chris Watkin (Monash University, chris.watkin@monash.edu) 
For the Love of Equality: Jean-Luc Nancy’s Adoration 
 
Philosophical discourse on the subject of political egalitarianism customarily privileges the demand for 
justice over any appeal to love, and for seemingly good reason: love is thought to be apolitical, impotent 
in the face of oppression and no revolutionary threat to those in power. In L’Adoration (2010, English 
translation to be published December 2012), Jean-Luc Nancy offers his most direct engagement to date 
with the theme of equality, and also one of his most sustained meditations on (agapic, erotic and filial) 
love. In so doing, he makes a compelling case for putting love at the centre of our thinking about 
equality. This paper first lays out the way in which Nancy relates love and equality in L’Adoration, 
setting it in the context of Being Singular Plural, Je t’aime . . . and “Shattered Love.” It then uses L’Adoration 
as a provocation to rethink the place of love in contemporary discussions of political equality by first 
showing how thinking equality without love for Nancy is structurally identical to the bad ‘general 
equivalence’ of capitalism, and then arguing that just as, for Nancy, communism is the truth of 
democracy, so also love is the truth of equality. The consequences of this re-inscription of love at the 
heart of equality are far-reaching: to seek equality without love is not only unloving but also rigorously 
and demonstrably un-egalitarian. This poses an important and uncomfortable challenge to the way we 
think about and engage in emancipatory politics. 
 
 
Bradley Warfield (University of South Florida, bradley.warfield@gmail.com) 
Charles Taylor and the Dialogical Moral Self 
 
In his most explicit treatment of Mikhail Bakhtin’s conception of the dialogical self, Charles Taylor 
suggests the endorsement of the latter’s view. On Bakhtin’s view, the dialogical self is composed of 
multiple, co-existing “voices,” “perspectives,” or “I positions” which remain on equal epistemic footing-
-and are in continuous dialogue--with one another (i.e., the “thick” version). Contra Taylor’s own 
claims, I argue that he must be committed to rejecting the Bakhtinian view, and must endorse, instead, 
a “thin” version of the dialogical self, in which the multiplicity of voices is subsumable, at any time, 
under a dominant voice. This is because this “thin” version alone is consistent with Taylor’s insistence, 
in his moral ontology, that for the health of the moral self a single “I position” must dominate the other 
“I positions,” thereby giving coherence to the relation between one’s moral deliberations and one’s 
“strong evaluative” moral self. 
 
 
Daniel Wilson (University of Auckland, dwil237@aucklanduni.ac.nz)   
‘The key to the Critique of taste’: Interpreting §9 of Kant’s Critique of Judgment 
 
In this talk I’m going to provide an interpretation of §9 of Kant’s Critique of Judgment where he describes 
how judgments of taste are performed. Interpreters are divided over the correct way to interpret what 
Kant means in the following sentence: “Hence it is the universal capacity for being communicated 
incident to the mental state in the given representation which, as the subjective condition of the 
judgement of taste, must be fundamental, with the pleasure in the object as its consequent.” The 
question is: How can Kant claim that an aesthetic judgment of the beautiful can be made (a judgment 
of pleasure or displeasure) while insisting that the pleasure is a consequence of the judging? I suggest 
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Andrew Wiltshire (University of Queensland, a.wiltshire@uq.edu.au) 
Reason and Undecidability in Derrida and Habermas 
 
Despite the burgeoning literature on the relation between Derrida and Habermas, there is a lack of 
analysis relating Habermas’ communicative reason to Derrida’s understanding of reason. This follows 
from a general lack of discussion concerning how Derrida’s philosophy, with its focus on structural 
undecidability and the constitutive outside, can positively transform our conception of reason. Although 
progress has been made over the relativistic interpretations, such as the one provided by Habermas, 
that took him to be participating in the outright rejection of reason, deconstruction still tends to be 
taken as standing in a purely negative relation to reason. Even those who highlight the ethical 
motivation behind deconstruction still tend to see the value of Derrida’s thought in its ability to 
demonstrate when reason negatively encroaches on the other, rather than in its possible contribution to 
a positive account. In this paper, by working within a Habermasian framework that acknowledges that 
reason must be situated within everyday communicative practices, I discuss how Derrida’s thought 
contributes to a positive transformation of our understanding of reason. 
 
 
Katherine Withy (Georgetown University, kaw84@georgetown.edu) 
Heidegger’s Antigone 
 
Sophocles’ Antigone is the only person whom Heidegger names as authentic. But in trying to make 
sense of Antigone’s authenticity, we encounter two problems. First, Heidegger’s Antigone seems quite 
unlike any Antigone we have seen before in Continental philosophy (e.g. in Hegel, Lacan, Butler). 
Heidegger thus forces us to think Antigone anew. Second, Heidegger’s Antigone seems to escape the 
usual interpretations of Heideggerian authenticity (as being-towards-death, as taking responsibility for 
norms, as world-historical creation, and as Aristotelian phronēsis). Antigone thus forces us to think 
Heidegger anew. The source of these two problems is the fact that, as Heidegger sees her, Antigone is 
authentically uncanny. What Heidegger means by “uncanniness” is (as is to be expected) quite unlike 
what Freud or Derrida mean by the term. Uncanniness is a feature of being — its presencing through 
absencing. Antigone is authentically uncanny insofar as she relates appropriately to being’s presencing 
by being responsive and appropriately to being’s absencing by being reticent. Heidegger’s Antigone is 
thus a surprisingly passive heroine, and not the radical and autonomous figure she is often taken to be. 
Correspondingly, the vision of authenticity that we find in Heidegger’s reading of the play signals 
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The journal will publish a special issue in 2013 featuring a selection of papers from the conference. 
 
We invite submissions of papers by 10th January 2013. Submissions 
should be in short form as presented at the conference. A selection will be made 
from these submissions by the guest editors and authors will be invited to 
prepare a longer version for publication. However, the guest editors reserve 
the right not to publish longer version papers if they do not meet the 
scholarly standards of the journal.  
 









A $500 prize will be awarded for the best postgraduate paper presented at the conference. 
 
We invite submissions or nominations by 10th January 2013. Please 
include a copy of the paper as presented at the conference. A committee 
will decide the prize shortly thereafter and the winner will be announced 
on the ASCP news list. The winning paper will also be considered for 
inclusion in the Parrhesia ASCP Special Issue. 
 






















Conference participants are welcome to access the Internet via the 
computers on campus or via the wireless network using personal computers 
or other devices. Both campus computers and the wireless network can be 
accessed using any one of the following login and password combinations: 
 
Login:  conf9031 Password: nulenkic 
Login:  conf9032 Password: mehilyni 
Login:  conf9033 Password: ke9a5ash 
 









We recommend travelling to and from Auckland Airport using the Airbus 
Express (www.airbus.co.nz) or Super Shuttle (www.supershuttle.co.nz). 
These are cheaper options than taxis. 
 




Places to Eat  
(vegetarian)  
&  
Supermarkets in the City 
 
Raw Power Café — Floor 1, 10 Vulcan Lane 
Revive Vegetarian Café — 33 Lorne St 






C O N F E R E N C E  D I N N E R  
          
 




Mecca Restaurant, Chancery 
http://www.meccacafe.com/ 
 
Chancery, Auckland Central 







Annual General Meeting 
          
 
The Annual General Meeting of the ASCP is scheduled for 
Wednesday afternoon of the conference, 12th December. If you have 
registered for the conference, then you are also a registered member of 
the ASCP (for the next 12 months), and you are entitled to participate 
in the AGM.  
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